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NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE LEGAL
 
STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS:
 
DISPATCHES FROM THE
 
ARABIAN GULF
 
DAVID MEDNICOFF* 
INTRODUCTION 
In many societies, including the United States, non-citizen mi­
grants1 are increasingly seen as a problem of national security.2 
This perception is in line with the nature and diversity of migration 
in an era of globalization, which brings waves of people from one 
country or area to others.  It also comports with the idea that secur­
ity increasingly encompasses subjective and politically-constructed 
issues that fit into the category of existential or identity threats.  A 
government’s consideration of an issue as a security challenge has 
implications; the issue receives privileges in terms of national atten­
tion and economic resources.3  Thus, securitizing a policy problem 
is the surest way of prioritizing it. 
* A.B., Princeton, A.M., J.D., Ph.D., Harvard, Assistant Professor of Public Pol­
icy and Associate Director, Social Thought and Political Economy Program, University 
of Massachusetts – Amherst.  The author wishes to thank the editors for their help, as 
well as Vanessa Megaw for her extensive research assistance. 
1. The issue of non-citizen workers is so charged that the very term for the people 
in question lacks standardization.  Because Arab Gulf governments formally reject the 
idea that workers from other countries can gain citizenship or other permanent-resident 
status, the term “migrant” or “muhajir” tends not to be used.  Rainer Baub ̈ock, How 
Immigration Transforms Citizenship: International, Multinational and Transnational 
Perspectives 11 ( ¨ ur in-Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften Forschungsstelle f ̈
stitutionellen Wandel und europäische Integration, Working Paper No. 24, 2002) http:// 
www.eif.oeaw.ac.at/downloads/workingpapers/IWE-Papers/WP24.pdf (on the Gulf 
state’s strategy of formally rejecting citizenship of migrant workers).  I have therefore 
deployed a mixture of terms, “non-citizen,” “migrant,” “guest worker,” and “non-na­
tional,” reflecting the contested nature of the subject. 
2. See Myron Weiner, Security, Stability and International Migration, 17 INT’L 
SEC. 91, 91-126 (1992) (providing an early example of some key analytical issues that 
are affected by this shift to view non-citizen migrants as a security problem). 
3. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & MAGALY  SANCHEZ R., BROKERED  BOUNDARIES: 
CREATING IMMIGRANT IDENTITY IN ANTI-IMMIGRANT TIMES 77 (2010) (stating that by 
2008 the number of hours that United States enforcement have spent on “line-watch 
hours stood at nearly eight times the 1986 level, the number of Border Patrol agents 
121 
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The national securitization of migration policy connects to a 
core notion of the nature of a national security threat, yet also de­
parts from it.4  The previous century of dramatic and destructive 
wars among nations helped define national security issues as na­
tional survival in terms of actual or perceived military threats from 
other countries and defense systems.5  However, in the new millen­
nium, interstate wars have given way to a more diverse array of 
sources of global instability, which include civil conflict, the use of 
force by non-state actors, and the increased absolute numbers of 
migrants and residents of multiple states.6 
My concern in this Article is with some of the implications of 
the fact that national security issues are increasingly more likely to 
be framed in terms of migration and movement of people than in 
terms of missiles and military capacity.  One important general im­
plication is that national security policy is shifting to include a wide 
range of national and state legislators and law enforcement agents 
along with military officials.7  Thus, national security is defined and 
regulated in the legal arena.  In fact, the popular salience and visi­
bility of migrants and issues surrounding them means that migra­
tion is a national security question peculiarly prone to democratic 
or populist contestation, the very opposite of the arcane, secret im­
age of more traditional interstate military security issues.8 
Yet, much of the thrust of this legalization and democratization 
of security policy is the restriction of legal migrants and migrants’ 
had increased by a factor of 4.7, and the Border Patrol’s budget was twenty times its 
1986 level”). 
4. See Stephen M. Walt, The Renaissance of Security Studies, 35 INT’L STUD. Q. 
211, 212 (1991) (defining the study of security within international relations theory as 
“the study of the threat, use and control of military force”). 
5. See, e.g., id. at 211-39. 
6. See The US National Intelligence Council on Growing Global Migration, 27 
POPULATION & DEV. REV. 817, 817-19 (report on implications of global migration), 
available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2695203; see also, ROGER  OWEN, STATE, 
POWER AND POLITICS IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 166-92, 200-13 
(1992) (discussing non-state actors’ roles in the Middle East). 
7. See BARRY  BUZAN  ET  AL., SECURITY: A NEW  FRAMEWORK FOR  ANALYSIS 
33-35 (1998) (examining the expansion of actors included in the discussion of securitiza­
tion); David Cole, The Missing Patriot Debate, THE  NATION, May 30, 2005, at 18-21 
(discussing the 2001 Patriot Act and immigration). 
8. Compare Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html 
(reporting on Arizona’s 2010 immigration law, providing a recent example of migration 
on the ballot), with DR. STRANGELOVE OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND 
LOVE THE BOMB (Columbia Pictures 1964) (providing an example, in this classic film 
directed by Stanley Kubric, of how the image of a secretive American military is well 
established within pop-culture). 
123 
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legal rights.  Opening up the legal and policy contestation of na­
tional security by shifting this rubric into the regulation of non-na­
tionals has therefore meant, at least in part, governmental embrace 
of laws and law enforcement that are costly, may not correspond to 
the country’s actual labor needs, and may fan the flames of internal 
national identity conflict.9  Of course, securitizing migrant labor 
policy also harms the rights and livelihood of guest workers.10 
Because of the above, the securitization of migration policy is 
not regarded favorably by many legal and other commentators.11 
Yet, it may be unrealistic to expect a fundamental reframing of na­
tional migration policies away from the security sphere, given that 
who is a stakeholder in a country remains fundamental as an aspect 
of national identity and integrity.  At the same time, it may be pos­
sible to imagine a country that securitizes migration policy, but not 
necessarily or consistently in a way that restricts the inflow of 
migrants. 
In fact, one need not imagine such a country, as this descrip­
tion fits in contemporary nations of the Arabian Gulf—some of the 
most dynamic and expansive, but also unusual, states in the world 
today.  The governments of nations like Kuwait, Qatar, and the 
United Arab Emirates are variations on a theme of non-democratic 
monarchical regimes.  And, these regimes are hardly models of 
human rights observance with respect to migrant workers.12  Yet 
they have managed unusual decades of rapid growth and increasing 
prominence, capped by Qatar’s selection as the site of the 2022 
World Cup, while avoiding so far the wave of political discontent 
9. See Wayne A. Cornelius & Takeyuki Tsuda, Controlling Immigration: The 
Limits of Government Intervention, in CONTROLLING  IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL  PER­
SPECTIVE 3, 9-11 (Wayne A. Cornelius et. al., eds., 2d ed. 2004) (discussing the conflict 
between countries’ labor needs and policy). 
10. See id. 
11. See id. (discussing mounting evidence that securitization of migration policy is 
not an effective or desirable method of limiting illegal immigration). 
12.  See, e.g., Maids in the Middle East: Little Better than Slavery, THE  ECON., 
Sept. 4, 2010, at 51 (providing a specific example of human rights abuses related to 
migrant workers in the Middle East); Middle East: End ‘Sponsored’ Gateway to Human 
Trafficking, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 14, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/06/ 
14/middle-east-end-sponsored-gateway-human-trafficking (listing Kuwait, Saudi Ara­
bia, and Qatar in its two lowest possible categories for efforts to combat human traffick­
ing and identifying evidence that migrant workers in the United Arab Emirates, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Jordan withholding passports and wages while en­
forcing long hours without adequate rest). 
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that swept the Arab world early in 2011.13  Could it be nonetheless 
that studying particular aspects of the interplay of national security, 
migrants and national identity in countries like Qatar can shed light 
on these issues in the more familiar context of the United States? 
My analysis below suggests that this is indeed the case. The 
handling of migrant workers in oil-rich, rapidly globalizing coun­
tries like Qatar and its Arab Gulf neighbors is highly problematic, 
and oftentimes exploitative or xenophobic.14  At the same time, the 
problems faced by migrants to the Gulf and the United States are 
different.  Despite Gulf societies’ lack of interest in allowing for cit­
izenship for guest workers, the predictability of contract and status 
issues for these workers, and the overall likelihood of ongoing need 
for high numbers of them represent important touchstones of cer­
tainty for migrants.15 
Predictability is much less prevalent in the American context 
of fluctuating politics and low legal limits for non-citizen workers. 
Thus, despite the United States’ promise of equal rights and poten­
tial citizenship for migrants, which are both noticeably absent from 
the political landscape of the Gulf, the American reality of unfore­
seeable spurts of intense enforcement, detention, deportation, and 
reductions in legal quotas for workers make for a difficult dynamic 
for contemporary migrants.16  In both cases, turning migration pol­
icy into a highly-charged issue of national security is the cause of 
widespread difficulties.  At the same time, determining which set of 
difficulties is more problematic is highly subjective. 
I proceed with this analysis in three stages.  Part I introduces 
Qatar as an exemplar Gulf Arab state, along with its current pres­
sures around legal reform and non-citizen workers.  Part II contex­
13. FIFA World Cup 2022 and its Impact on the Qatar Economy, BARRBIZ, Vol. 
2 Issue 2, Mar. 2011, available at http://www.barrconsultancy.com/pdf/barbiz-qatar-ex­
pect-amazing-fifa-worldcup-2022-vol-2-issue-2.pdf. 
14. See, e.g., Ray Jureidini, Migrant Workers and Xenophobia in the Middle East, 
UNITED  NATIONS  RES. INST. FOR  SOC. DEV. (Dec. 31, 2003), http://www.unrisd.org/ 
unrisd/website/document.nsf/0/045B62F1548C9C15C1256E970031D80D?Open 
Document. 
15. Despite the problems related to workers rights, a clearer set of rules does 
improve the overall reputation of Qatar to migrant workers.  According to a Himalayan 
newspaper, Qatar is the second most desirable country for Nepalese people to work in. 
Himalayan News Service, HRW Slams Kuwait for Exploitation of Migrant Workers, 
THE  HIMALAYAN  TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, http://www.thehimalayantimes.com/printNepali 
News.php?id=261004. 
16. See Rob Paral, No Way In: U.S. Immigration Policy Leaves Few Legal Op­
tions for Mexican Workers, IMMIGR. POL’Y IN  FOCUS, July 2005, at 5 (discussing the 
difficulties faced by those wishing to immigrate legally into the U.S.). 
125 
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tualizes the issue of the rule of law and identity in contemporary 
Arab politics generally.  In Part III, I discuss the law and politics of 
citizen regulation as a security issue in Qatar and the Gulf.  In Part 
IV, I draw implications from Qatar and the Gulf regarding the 
securitization of regulating migrants more generally. 
I. QATAR, LAW AND SECURITY 
Most Americans would be hard-pressed to locate Qatar on a 
map, despite the fact that it is the only nation to begin with the 
letter “Q” in the English language, and, more to the point, one of 
the fastest-growing economies in the world.17  Until the end of the 
twentieth century, it was a backwater trading post in the Middle 
East.18  Qatar, like the other former Trucial States located on the 
western shore of the Arabian Gulf, enjoyed limited political auton­
omy and foreign relations protection by the British until gaining 
independence comparatively late in 1971.19  Among many indica­
tors of the country’s small size and recent nationhood, its first and 
only public university opened in 1973.20 
Yet, in May 2009, Qatar played host to perhaps the most illus­
trious array of global legal luminaries in modern history.  Hundreds 
convened at the first Qatar Law Forum for three days to discuss 
varied issues underscoring their shared commitment to the rule of 
law.21  Attendees included prestigious judges, including the heads 
of the International Court of Justice and the European Court of 
Human Rights, numerous U.S. Federal District and Appeals Court 
judges, prominent lawyers, and high-powered legal academics from 
nearly fifty countries and six continents.22 
17. See Gina Coleman, Qatar: The Fastest Growing Economy in the World, THE 
MIDDLE  EAST, (Apr. 2001), http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2742/is_2001_ 
April/ai_n25033766/pg_2/?tag=content;col1 (discussing the economic development of 
Qatar); Moin Siddiqi, Qatar: A Beacon of Stability in Troubled Times, THE  MIDDLE 
EAST, (June 1, 2010), http://www.faqs.org/periodicals/201006/2063748211.html. 
18. See ROSEMARIE SAID ZAHLAN, THE CREATION OF QATAR 11-24 (1979). 
19. See id. at 106-07 (providing a detailed account of Qatar reaching statehood). 
20. In 1973, Qatar founded two teacher colleges that provided the foundation for 
a university in Qatar, which officially opened in 1977. Id. at 130-31; see also Asma al 
Attiyah & Batoul Khalifa, Small Steps Lead to Quality Assurance and Enhancement in 
Qatar University, 15 QUALITY IN  HIGHER  EDUC. 29, 29-38 (2009) (providing further 
information about the development of education at Qatar University). 
21. See Overview, QATAR  LAW  FORUM (May 31, 2009), http://www.qatarlaw 
forum.com/en/qlf-overview (providing descriptions and links to media coverage of the 
forum). 
22. See Participants, QATAR  LAW  FORUM (May 31, 2009), http://www.qatarlaw 
forum.com/en/qlf-participants. 
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One of the United Kingdom’s pre-eminent jurists, former 
Chief Justice of England and Wales, Lord Woolf, helped run the 
meeting in his capacity as the President of a new court established 
by Qatar’s government to resolve disputes related to the country’s 
financial and construction projects.23  Professors and administrators 
from Harvard Law School and several other important American 
legal academies were among the Forum’s organizers.24  While the 
Forum was sponsored and hosted by Qatar’s government and a pri­
vate Arab foundation, the proceedings included copious advice by 
mainly American and British jurists about how Qatar is and others 
might learn from Anglo-American common law experience.25 
Qatar’s unusual combination of extensive oil and natural gas 
revenues and tiny native population enabled the government to 
host an event like the Qatar Law Forum relatively affordably.26  At 
the same time, particularly in light of the somewhat Western-centric 
condescending tone of many of the Anglo-American speakers, the 
question can certainly be raised of why Qatar did so.  Here I sug­
gest that the Forum is part of a broader phenomenon of law’s and 
legal discourse’s import as a currency for national security issues 
around national identity and non-citizen workers. 
More basically, the Forum illustrated several important trends 
about law in non-Western, rapidly-globalizing contexts like the oil-
rich states of the Eastern Arab world.  Societies like Qatar, though 
relative backwaters in the history of the Middle East, share with the 
rest of the region a permeation of diverse, structured legal tradi­
23. See Julia Berris, Lord Woolf, William Blair QC to Launch Qatar’s Commer­
cial Court, THE  LAWYER, (May 14, 2007), http://www.thelawyer.com/lord-woolf­
william-blair-qc-to-launch-qatar’s-commercial-court/125782.article. 
24. See Program, QATAR  LAW  FORUM (May 31, 2009), http://www.qatarlaw 
forum.com/en/system/files/QLF.pdf [hereinafter Program]. 
25. An Introduction to the New Qatar International Judiciary, QATAR  LAW  FO­
RUM (May 31, 2009), http://www.qatarlawforum.com/en/system/files/New+Qatar+ 
International+Judiciary.pdf [hereinafter An Introduction].  For instance, the panel dis­
cussion titled “An Introduction to the new Qatar International Judiciary” was described 
as “an opportunity for the members of the Qatar Financial Centre’s . . . new Civil and 
Commercial Court and Regulatory Tribunal to introduce themselves,” but were pre­
sided over primarily by Lord Woolf and Sir. William Blair of England, and focused 
primarily on the ways that the two new entities should model the judiciary entities in 
London. Id. 
26. See Moin Siddiqi, Qatar: A Beacon of Stability in Troubled Times, THE MID­
DLE EAST, June 1, 2010 (describing how Qatar’s wealth allowed the Qatar Law Forum 
to take place); see also Francis Gibb, Qatar Law Forum: Anyone Who is Anyone Cele­
brates the Rule of Law, THE SUNDAY TIMES, June 4, 2009, http://business.timesonline. 
co.uk/tol/business/law/article6424382.ece (discussing the importance of the Qatar Law 
Forum at a time of financial crisis). 
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tions, especially that of the shari’a, or Islamic law.27  Nonetheless, 
the dissolution of Islamic imperial control, and any imagined notion 
of a united Islamic political community, or umma, along with the 
collapse of the Ottomans by the end of World War I meant that 
shari’a became a small part of a more complex mosaic of Western 
and Middle Eastern legal systems.28 
As a practical matter, this broad Middle Eastern phenomenon 
was less sweeping in small desert trading post societies like Doha, 
Qatar, and its neighbors than in central Arab population centers 
like Egypt and Lebanon.29  Yet, the relegation to small spheres of 
traditional Islamic law throughout the Arab world meant that even 
in tiny trading posts, shari’a began to take on more of a role as a 
symbolic reference point than a central focal point of governance.30 
In short, after nearly a century of Western legal control or influ­
ence, Arab states had legal systems that merged many diverse ele­
ments in a social context in which one of the least utilized—Islamic 
law—was both more established and more legitimate historically.31 
The small Arab trading backwaters grouped together under 
British external control and protection, as the Trucial States, includ­
ing contemporary Qatar, were distinct variations of this pattern 
mostly because their legal systems had not seen the centralization, 
secularization, and grafting of Western European legal codes that 
marked the more populous Arab former colonies of France and the 
UK.32  For a place like Qatar, this simply meant that a legal system 
was not sufficiently in place to handle the breakneck growth that 
occurred in recent oil-rich decades, while Islamic sources of law re­
mained popular, if ambiguous. 
Amidst this backdrop, Qatar, like other Arab states, has had 
increasing connections to a Western foreign policy industry, with 
27. NATHAN J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD 175-85 (1997) 
[hereinafter THE RULE OF LAW]. 
28. See NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD 
162-80 (Shahrough Akhavi & Said Amir Arjomand eds., 2002) [hereinafter NONCON­
STITUTIONAL WORLD]. 
29. THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 27, at 185-86. R 
30. NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD, supra note 28, at 162-80. R 
31. Id. 
32. There are several major differences that separate Qatar’s contemporary con­
text towards migration from other Arab nations. These include their great relative 
wealth, their general rejection of the concept of foreigners naturalizing, and that they 
were “never officially a colony of any European power” (although they were a “pro­
tected state” under the British rule).  Sharon Nagy, Making Room for Migrants, Making 
Sense of Difference: Spatial and Ideological Expressions of Social Diversity in Urban 
Qatar, 43 URB. STUD. 119, 121 (2006). 
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the United States at the center; this industry aims to enhance the 
rule of law in non-Western countries.33  This recent vintage of legal­
ist wine fits partly in the old bottles of “law and development” prac­
titioners in the 1960s and 1970s.34  At the same time, contemporary 
U.S. rule-of-law reform efforts take place in a setting of globalized 
inter-connectedness,35 where international law and the legal norms 
of one society are easily accessible and often salient elsewhere,36 
and where Arab domestic and regional legal initiatives are signifi­
cant, as the Qatar Law Forum exemplified.37 
Multiple and contending discourses and practices around the 
rule of law suggest a complex picture for the politics of Western 
rule-of-law aid.  Nonetheless, the basic message is non-Western 
countries intent on hyper-globalized growth should move to con­
form with Western ideas of the rule of law, both in terms of busi­
ness law and human rights.  This is analogous and connected to the 
notion that emerged in the 1990s in the economic sphere that non-
Western countries should move towards observance of a set of neo­
33. For trends on increasing connections to Western foreign policy, see Rami 
Khouri, Director, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the 
American University of Beirut, Lecture at Georgetown University: America, the Mid­
dle East, and the Gulf: An Arab View of Challenges Facing the Next U.S. Administra­
tion (Aug. 24, 2008), in 1 CIRS BRIEF 1 (2008), available at http://www12.georgetown. 
edu/sfs/qatar/cirs/EnglishRamiKhouriBrief.pdf.  The contemporary rule-of-law aid 
movement generally dates back to the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the 
rapid political and economic reform needs of Eastern European and Baltic countries. 
See generally Thomas Carothers, Rule of Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE  RULE OF 
LAW ABROAD 3, 8 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006). Substantial rule-of-law projects are 
implemented through the U.S. governments’ Department of State and Agency for In­
ternational Development, as well as semi-autonomous organizations like the U.S. Insti­
tute for Peace and private contractors. Id. at 10.  In the case of Middle East work, 
much of the funding and the recent expansion in programs have taken place through 
the Middle East Partnership Initiative. See U.S. State Dep’t., About MEPI, THE MID­
DLE E. PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE, http://mepi.state.gov/about-us.html (last visited Nov. 
20, 2010).  In the current strategic plan of the U.S. Department of State and Agency for 
International Development, rule-of-law reform aid was the top priority within its sec­
ond broad policy strategy of “[g]overning [j]ustly and [d]emocratically.”  U.S. Depart­
ment of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, Strategic Plan: Fiscal 
Years 2007-2012 18-19 (2007). 
34. Carothers, supra note 33, at 15-16. R 
35. See, e.g., DAVID  HELD, ANTHONY  MCGREW, DAVID  GOLDBLATT  & 
JONATHAN PERRATON, GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CUL­
TURE (1999). 
36. See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 
1155-56 (2007); see also Noah Feldman, When Judges Make Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Sept. 25, 2008, at 50 (discussing the connection of U.S. judges to foreign legal 
norms). 
37. See Program, supra note 24 (providing a program, including a list of topics). R 
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liberal economic measures known in the developmental economic 
policy world as the Washington Consensus.38 
As Qatar has transformed rapidly through oil revenues into a 
dynamic engine of global growth, it has come increasingly under the 
scrutiny of Western governments, whose corporations have rushed 
to take advantage of the tiny country’s opportunities.39  Thus, the 
central event of the Qatar Law Forum, the unveiling of the 
sheikhdom’s new tribunal to resolve commercial and other civil dis­
putes arising from construction projects in the small country, was, 
not surprisingly, a clear symbolic assertion of Qatar’s conformity 
with global legal standards.40 
Yet, it is far from inevitable that legal standards facilitating 
Western business involvement and international human rights work 
together in harmony.  This is particularly the case in Gulf countries 
like Qatar that manifest a second trend that was clear to partici­
pants in the Qatar Law Forum.  The event, which took place at one 
of Doha’s fanciest hotels, was staffed by hundreds of workers of 
diverse non-Qatari nationality.41  Because of the sharp discontinu­
ity of Qatar’s small indigenous population and the tremendous 
growth plans which oil has made possible, the country has brought 
hundreds and thousands of workers from throughout the world to 
build, manage, teach, and work in domestic households.42  This 
rapid population influx has left the native population and 
workforce a tiny minority of less than 10% in their own country.43 
38. CLEMENT M. HENRY & ROBERT  SPRINGBORG, GLOBALIZATION AND THE 
POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 15 (Eugene L. Rogan ed., 2001). For 
more on the Washington Consensus and its application to Arab states of the Middle 
East and North Africa, see id. at ch. 1-2. 
39. See From Deleware to Doha: the Legal Environment Necessary for Corporate 
Centres and Thriving Financial Markets, QATAR  LAW  FORUM (May 30, 2009), http:// 
www.qatarlawforum.com/en/system/files/From_Delaware_to_Doha.pdf.  One of the 
panels at the Forum, entitled “From Delaware to Doha,” explored the legal elements 
that Qatar would need to adopt to promote it as a global financial center. See id. 
40. See Gibb, supra note 26.  Two of the main events of the Forum included: R 
“Qatar’s new commercial and civil court, set up by Lord Woolf (its president) and 
staffed by former UK judges” and “regulatory tribunal under Sir William Blair, the 
High Court judge.” Id. 
41. I had the privilege of attending and observed this myself. 
42. See Claude Berrebi, Francisco Martorell & Jeffery C. Tanner, Qatar’s Labor 
Markets at a Crucial Crossroad, 63 MIDDLE EAST J. 421, 430 (2009) (discussing Qatar’s 
population growth due to immigration and its economic dependency upon foreign 
workers). 
43. According to the U.S. State Department, “[f]oreign workers comprise as 
much as 85% of the total population and make up about 90% of the total labor force.” 
BACKGROUND NOTE: QATAR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.state. 
gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5437.htm. 
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And therein lies the real story behind the story of the Qatar 
Law Forum.  Qatar, like other Arab societies of the Persian Gulf, 
depends on massive influxes of migrant workers to carry out its 
growth.44  Yet, the demographic balance this has created, in making 
natives a small group within their own society, fosters a ready per­
ception of non-citizen residents as a challenge to national security 
and emergent identity.45  As a result, countries like Qatar have gen­
erally set up a system of foreign worker sponsorship, known there 
and elsewhere in Arab Gulf countries as kefala, in which workers 
are tied to their employers and citizenship or even permanent mi­
gration is not possible.46 
This, in turn, has drawn the scrutiny of global rights groups, 
who insist that the working conditions for many foreign workers in 
the region violate international law.47  And, between the critical 
role national and transnational levels of law play in making sense of 
globalization48 and the historically salient legitimacy of shari’a, the 
legal sphere is central as a practical and symbolic place where the 
nature and rules around work, citizenship, and identity are 
contested. 
The interplay between large migrant labor populations and 
small groups of natives thus produces a push-pull dynamic of signif­
icant global pressures on Gulf governments like Qatar to improve 
their fealty to human rights, along with concerns from local citi­
zens that the identity and social cohesion of their countries 
might be undermined should migrants be able to stay indef­
initely or acquire citizenship.49  As a partial result of this dy­
44. Berrebi et al., supra note 42, at 430-32. R 
45. Rainer Baubock, How Migration Transforms Citizenship: International, Mul­¨
tinational, and Transnational Perspectives 11 (IWE, Working Paper Series, Feb. 24, 
2002), available at http://www.eif.oeaw.ac.at/downloads/workingpapers/IWE-Papers/ 
WP24.pdf (discussing the Gulf state’s strategy of formally rejecting citizenship of mi­
grant workers to prevent challenges to the concept of national identity). For example, 
women in Qatar increasingly feel insecure about walking in their neighborhoods be­
cause of the influx of foreign workers.  Nagy, supra note 32, at 126. R 
46. ANH NGA LONGVA, WALLS BUILT ON SAND: MIGRATION, EXCLUSION, AND 
SOCIETY IN KUWAIT 94-97 (1997). 
47. See UAE: Meetings Should Address Migrant Workers’ Rights, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Jan, 20, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/01/17/uae-meetings-should­
address-migrant-workers-rights. 
48. See, e.g., SASKIA  SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS (2006); Robert 
Howse, Book Review–The End of the Globalization Debate: A Review Essay, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1529-30 (2008). 
49. This push-pull relationship is evident in an interview with Dahi Khalfan 
Tamin, police chief of the Qatari police force. After stating great concern for the Arab 
identity in response to the influx of immigrant workers, he laments that Qatar may have 
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namic,50 Gulf governments expend significant resources to improve 
their global image with respect to the rule of law, such as the Qatar 
Law Forum.51  This is because it is easier for wealthy countries with 
small populations to spend money to put on a global conference on 
law than it is to balance the difficult and diverse transnational and 
national pressures involved in increasing migrant workers’ legal 
rights. 
Thus, the rule of law, as it applies to native identity, workers’ 
rights, and international legal actors, is crucial to the politics of the 
contemporary Persian Gulf, and takes on unique aspects with the 
rapidity of Gulf societies’ oil-driven growth and globalization.52  In 
other words, if the status of migrant workers is central to Arab Gulf 
concerns about security, then law is the means through which this 
security issue is regulated.  This means that the rule of law is the 
major arena through which the politics of security are contested 
symbolically, similar to the way that missiles and deterrence formed 
the core of symbolic politics around security in the US during the 
Cold War era.  In short, the rule of law in societies like Qatar is a 
critical currency of national security concerns, and this helps ac­
count for the emphasis the small country put on staging the Qatar 
Law Forum. 
The rule of law in Qatar and similar wealthy, rapidly globaliz­
ing Arab countries has multiple dimensions.  This has to do with the 
centrality that a relatively conservative version of Islam plays as the 
social and cultural glue for the small native population of such 
to bow to the pressures of foreign human rights organizations. See Update: Expatirates 
Are the Future Threat of the Entire Gulf: HE Dahi Khalfan Tamim: Excerpts from the 
Interview of Dahi Khalfan Tamim in a Qatar Television Show Titled ‘Laqum Al Qarar’ 
(The Decision is Yours), THE PENINSULA, Dec. 29, 2010, http://www.thepeninsulaqatar. 
com/qatar/137276-fupdate-expatriates-are-the-future-threat-of-the-entire-gulf-he-dahi­
khalfan-tamim.html. 
50. I do not explore directly in this Article the obvious economic incentives for 
Gulf governments to put in place legal provisions that attract foreign investment, al­
though this clearly undergirds my broader arguments about national security in the 
pages that follow. 
51. Other examples of Qatar’s dedication to improving its global image can be 
seen in a 2003 60 Minutes television interview. See 60 Minutes: Qatar Embracing De­
mocracy, (CBS television broadcast Aug. 3, 2003), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
stories/2003/07/25/60minutes/main565155.shtml?tag=mncol;lst;1 (providing a transcript 
of the broadcast); see also Qatar Embracing Democracy, (CBS television broadcast 
Aug. 3, 2003), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6kU9gkmrmxg&feature= 
related (providing actual interview video uploaded to YouTube and available as of last 
visit on Nov. 20, 2010). 
52. See LONGVA, supra note 46, at 7 (providing a specific study of how migration R 
has been an integral part of a Persian Gulf State). 
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countries.53  The issue is not so much one of social conformity or 
lack of tolerance; rather, it is that places like Qatar have, and are 
likely to continue to have, codified endorsements of Islam as the 
established state religion and the official basis of all legislation.54 
Yet this accompanies a great deal of social change around the broad 
theme of rapid socioeconomic and cultural growth, with extraordi­
narily rapid connections to global business and tourism. 
The multiplicity of rule-of-law discourse is also due to the em­
bedded conflict in the two broad aims of Western legalist reform. 
First, there is an economic stake in facilitating stable market and 
property transactions for transnational capital.55  Second, there is a 
political concern for improving individual rights and opening up the 
political process in aid-recipient countries.56  These two goals may 
not be mutually reinforcing.57  Indeed, efforts to enhance the rule 
of law to improve the predictability of market transactions and the 
reliability of contracts can accompany, and possibly enhance, non­
democratic regime stability. 
Much of the question of how to resolve the possible embedded 
contradiction between the rule of law as a business-facilitator and a 
rights-facilitator in countries like Qatar hinges on the relation be­
tween internal Arab politics, with its tropes of political legitimation, 
and external political influences.  Although the roles of courts and 
lawyers in the West suggest associations between legalism and liber­
ties, social scientists, and policy practitioners have few conclusions 
about what actually works in liberalizing rule-of-law promotion in 
non-democratic settings.58  This problem of knowledge is especially 
acute in the Arab world.  Arab states generally share two features 
53. THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 27, at 184-86. R 
54. U.S. DEP’T OF  STATE, supra note 43 (stating that Qatar’s state religion is R 
Islam). 
55. Timothy W. Luke, Dependent Development and the Arab OPEC States, 45 J. 
POL. 979, 979-1003 (1983). This dependence is still implied because of Qatar’s heavy 
reliance on oil.  According to reporting on a 2003 broadcast of CBS Sunday Morning, 
“Barely one percent of Qatar’s land is arable, but it holds substantial oil, and enough 
estimated natural gas reserves to supply the U.S. market for the next 200 years.” Sun­
day Morning: Qatar in Transition, (CBS television broadcast Mar. 2, 2003), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/02/27/sunday/main542281.shtml?tag=mncol;lst;2; 
see also AAMIR A. REHMAN, DUBAI & CO.: GLOBAL  STRATEGIES FOR  DOING  BUSI­
NESS IN THE GULF STATES 80 (2008). 
56. RHONDA L. CALLAWAY & ELIZABETH G. MATTHEWS, STRATEGIC US FOR­
EIGN ASSISTANCE: THE BATTLE BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
9-12, 28 (2008). 
57. Id. 
58. LAWRENCE C. MAYER ET AL., COMPARITIVE POLITICS 330-33 (2001). 
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that render external rule-of-law aid particularly difficult—long­
standing nondemocratic governments, and legal systems that graft 
Ottoman, European, and contemporary sources onto residual Is­
lamic norms.59 
In Arab Gulf societies like Qatar, these challenges go along 
with the peculiar demographic and political issue that establishing 
true equality of rights between natives and the large majority non­
native citizen workers would endanger both identity and stability of 
these young, rapidly-growing and non-elected political systems.  At 
the same time, the tension between maximizing open business con­
nections for Western firms and policing international rights viola­
tions of workers provides temptations for privileged outsiders to 
turn something of a blind eye to the rights problems in practice.60 
All of this was on prominent display at the Qatar Law Forum, 
where there were some, albeit mostly limited, abstract disagree­
ments or divergent emphases on Western and Arab implementa­
tions of the rule of law, while migrant mostly non-Western workers 
in the area surrounding the conference hotel carried out their long 
shifts under exploitative conditions in at least some cases.61 
This is not to suggest that either Gulf Arabs or American legal 
reformers are monolithic in their general attitudes towards the rule 
of law, democracy, or the treatment of migrant workers.  Certainly, 
many, perhaps most, Arabs desire more predictable, responsive, 
59. THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 27, at 2-5 (providing information on European R 
and Ottoman influences in drafting the legal systems).  Moreover, U.S. rule-of-law advi­
sors face an added daunting impediment: widespread, twofold Arab skepticism about 
the United States as the messenger for the rule of law in the Middle East.  Aziz Al-
Azmeh, Populism Contra Democracy: Recent Democratist Discourse in the Arab World, 
in DEMOCRACY WITHOUT DEMOCRATS?: THE RENEWAL OF POLITICS IN THE MUSLIM 
WORLD 112 (Ghassan Salamé ed., 2001).  Many Arabs believe that U.S. policy makers 
neither know nor care to know basic aspects of law, politics, and society in Arab coun­
tries.  Jacqueline Shoen, Practice What you Preach, MAJALLA, Mar. 4, 2011, http://www. 
majalla.com/en/ideas/article300246.ece.  And, there is an even stronger and equally 
widespread perception that the United States follows in the tradition of earlier Western 
powers in not always practicing globally what it preaches about the rule of law, particu­
larly in the Middle East. Id. 
60. See, e.g., Daniel Heradstveit & G. Matthew Bohnam, The Psychology of Cor­
ruption in Azerbaijan and Iran, in OIL IN THE GULF: OBSTACLES TO DEMOCRACY AND 
DEVELOPMENT 72, 80 (Daniel Heradstveit & Helg Hveem eds., 2004) (asserting that 
prominent members of the political opposition in Azerbaijan expressed “disappoint­
ment that Western oil companies can make profitable agreements with a dictator who 
does not hesitate to violate human rights”). 
61. See Asian Migrant Workers Abandoned to Abuse, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 
17, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/12/18/asian-migrant-workers-abandoned­
abuse (providing a general description about the abuses faced by migrant workers in 
the Middle East). 
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and fair laws, as attention continues to highlight the problems and 
prospects for political change in the region.62  The 2004 Arab 
Human Development Report is one prominent statement by Arabs 
of the central importance of the rule of law to social improvement, 
and the statement was repeated in the more recent 2009 report.63 
Indeed, the most transparent purpose of the Qatar Law Forum 
was to demonstrate and improve global commitment to the rule of 
law.64  At the same time, the small, wealthy Arab state’s self-posi­
tioning at the center of transnational legalism is also a clear attempt 
to gloss over the difficult role law must play in the government’s 
difficult task of shoring up citizens’ rights and privileges as a tiny 
minority amidst one of the world’s largest and most globally diverse 
migrant labor markets.  The fact that Qatar’s demographic compo­
sition makes this issue distinctly one of national security, I suggest, 
creates some of its particular difficulties, as well as highlighting a 
different approach to non-native rights as a national security prob­
lem than that of the United States. 
II. ARAB RULES OF LAW UNDER GLOBALIZATION 
The analysis so far provides a flavor for how issues of the rule 
of law, migration, and national identity may be both particularly 
salient and contested in the contemporary young Arab states bor­
dering the Persian Gulf.  This section adds analytical weight to this 
62. UNITED  NATIONS  DEV. PROGRAMME  REG’L  BUREAU FOR  ARAB  STATES, 
ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004: TOWARD FREEDOM IN THE ARAB WORLD 
165 (2004), http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2004e.pdf. Random-
sample survey research on political topics is increasingly available for at least some 
Arab societies.  For example, the World Values Survey now includes Algeria, Egypt, 
Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. See Mark Tessler, Do Islamic Orientations 
Influence Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Arab World?  Evidence from the World 
Values Survey in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Algeria, in VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS OF 
THE ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE EASTERN PUBLICS 105, 122 (Mansoor Moaddel, ed., 2007); 
see also JAMES  ZOGBY, WHAT  ARABS  THINK, at iii (2002) (providing a study asking 
general questions regarding political issues to Arabs from Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Leba­
non, Kuwait, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia); CDDRL Inaugu­
rates New Program on Political Reform in the Arab World, FREEMAN  SPOGLI  INSTIT. 
FOR  INT’L  STUDIES AT  STANFORD U. (May 10, 2010), http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/ 
6102/Arab_Reform_Conference_Report-37.pdf (providing a succinct summary of the 
question of political change in Arab countries). 
63. See UNITED  NATIONS  DEV. PROGRAMME, REG’L  BUREAU FOR  ARAB 
STATES, ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2009: CHALLENGES TO HUMAN SECUR­
ITY IN THE  ARAB  COUNTRIES 7, 69, 193 (July 21, 2009), http://www.arab-hdr.org/ 
publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2009e.pdf. 
64. See Mission Statement, QATAR  LAW  FORUM (May 30, 2009), http://qatarlaw 
forum.com/en/qatar-law-forum. 
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sketch.  Because law, migrant workers, and nationhood are so inter­
twined and fluid in countries like Qatar, the question of migrants’ 
legal status is securitized.  That is to say, migrant workers’ rights are 
so caught up in basic issues of legal development and political iden­
tity that this topic has an apparently organic connection to national 
security. 
The broad context of legal growth and migrant human rights in 
Qatar comes from the particular Arab historical juxtaposition of a 
well-developed legal order, the shari’a, and subsequent experience 
with the imperial implementation of Western legal norms in the 
Middle East and North Africa.65  If countries like Qatar are eager 
to show fealty to global understandings of the rule of law, this does 
not necessarily make their citizens readily accepting of the idea that 
Western lawyers and advisors should tell them how to build or 
change their legal systems. 
In part, this is because of confusion in the multiple ways that 
the rule of law is conceptualized.  If “[t]he rule of law . . . stands in 
the peculiar state of being the preeminent legitimizing ideal in the 
world today,”66 its many possible definitions have led some theo­
rists to dismiss the significance of “this bit of ruling-class chatter.”67 
In particular, the rule of law tends to move between general ideals 
of equality, fairness, and perhaps the protection of individual rights, 
on the one hand,68 to specific institutional arrangements, on the 
other.  Yet understanding how the rule of law as an ideal can link to 
specific institutions and reforms is not well-theorized. 
There is little empirical research as to how legalist ideals and 
practices are connected in Arab societies.69  Yet, the rule of law has 
65. THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 27, at 179-85. R 
66. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 4 
(2004). 
67. Judith Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in THE  RULE OF  LAW: 
IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1, 1 (Alan Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan, eds., 1987). 
68. Danilo Zolo, The Rule of Law: A Critical Reappraisal, in THE RULE OF LAW: 
HISTORY, THEORY AND CRITICISM 3, 55 (Pietro Costa & Danilo Zolo, eds., 2007). 
69. Existing work tends to focus on judicial opinions and the function of courts, 
rather than on whether or how popular understanding of or respect for law may matter 
to legal and political systems more generally. See generally THE RULE OF LAW IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
(Eugene Cotran & Mai Yamani eds., 2000) (exploring whether and to what extent the 
international standards of human rights should be observed in Middle Eastern and Is­
lamic countries).  As insightful and important as this research is, both its sparseness and 
lack of specific argument as to how legal functionaries contribute to broader rule-of-law 
ideals or liberalizing political outcomes serve to underscore the problem of knowledge 
for rule-of-law programs in places like the Middle East. But see generally THE RULE OF 
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long been critical as doctrine in the Arab world. The Middle East­
ern origin of two of the most renowned, ancient legal codes—the 
Code of Hammurabi and the Judeo-Christian Bible—should not be 
forgotten.  More to the point, Islamic and Ottoman socio-legal tra­
ditions that contribute to contemporary Arab law predate the An-
glo-American common law by centuries.70  Thus, discussion about 
the reformist pressures on the rule of law in Arab states cannot 
proceed without recognition that the general concept has deep Mid­
dle Eastern roots.  Indeed, Islam’s long history of prioritizing law 
and mechanisms for its evolution mean that one indigenous Arab 
version of rule-of-law ideals remains very popular today.71 
More specifically, Islam originated as a social system that com­
bined “din wadawla,” religion, and polity.72  Naturally, law 
emerged as the central glue to guide the growth and administration 
of the millions of people throughout the Middle East, North Africa, 
and Southern Europe who comprised the early Islamic empire from 
the seventh through the thirteenth centuries.73  While facets of con­
temporary Western and global articulation of the rule of law cannot 
simply be retro-fitted or read into Islamic political history, the core 
term for Islamic law, shari’a, prioritizes legal order and brings to­
gether legal doctrine and judicial decisions.74  In other words, this 
traditional Arab Islamic term itself is one way of translating, if not 
necessarily transplanting, some of what is understood as the rule of 
law; it is likely to be viewed by many Muslim Arabs as the correct 
Arabic term for the concept.  In general, then, the idea of the rule 
of law was central and well-developed within Islam; political institu­
tional practice was the problem.75 
The complex political and doctrinal history of shari’a merits far 
more detailed treatment than can be undertaken here. Yet, several 
LAW, supra note 27, at 187-220 (providing information on courts in Arab countries that R 
provides insights regarding embedded Arab authoritarian politics). 
70. Compare ANTHONY BLACK, THE HISTORY OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT 
9-13 (2001) (discussing the foundations of Islam in the seventh century), with KEVIN M. 
TEEVEN, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 1-5 (1990) (discussing 
the foundation of Anglo-American common law during the thirteenth century). 
71. NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 20-21 (2008). 
72. ERWIN ISAK JAKOB ROSENTHAL, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM 
8-9 (1968). 
73. See W.M. BALLANTYNE, ESSAYS AND  ADDRESSES ON  ARAB  LAWS 34-35 
(2000). 
74. FELDMAN, supra note 71, at 117-21. R 
75. See KHALED ABOU EL FADL, ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY 
12-16 (2004) (providing a general account of the tension between the ideal and practice 
of the rule of law in Islam). 
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significant points, though they might be partial over-simplifications, 
facilitate an appreciation of the ongoing influence of Islamic ideals 
in the contemporary Arab politics of the rule of law. First, Islamic 
law evolved and grew mainly through the role and efforts of schol­
ars and judges, but without an ironclad institutional check on the 
power of rulers.  This led the conflict between the empowering and 
power-enabling tendencies of law to resolve ultimately towards the 
latter.76  Second, the ideals of Islamic politics and the rule of law 
remained a useful political language after the end of Islamic gov­
ernment in much of the Middle East and North Africa.77  Moreo­
ver, the scholarly, non-codified history of Islamic law is closer to the 
Anglo-American common law tradition than subsequent major le­
gal influences in many Middle Eastern countries.78  This Article ex­
plains each of these points in turn. 
First, because Islam emerged rapidly as a system of social gov­
ernance, as well as a creed, it is hardly surprising that a law-forming 
class of Muslims also developed quickly.79  Religious scholars were 
the natural source for legal interpretation, because Muhammad’s 
Islamic status as God’s final Prophet meant that either his recorded 
prophecies in the Qur’an or the sayings (hadith) quotes attributed 
to him otherwise, collectively known as the sunna, formed the basis 
of the most reliable dicta for ordering society.80 
Moreover, the relatively small number of explicitly legal 
passages in the Qur’an and the governing challenges that grew with 
the spectacular expansion of Islam in the several centuries after 
Muhammad’s death meant that legal needs and sources were too 
diverse to allow for simple derivation from the founding documents 
of the religion.81  Over time, scholars built an elaborate intellectual 
interpretative edifice to find ways to codify and extend through rea­
76. ALEXANDER D. KNYSH, IBN ‘ARABI IN THE LATER ISLAMIC TRADITION 56-57 
(1999). 
77. See FELDMAN, supra note 71, at 4-7. R 
78. See RAFAEL  DOMINGO, THE  NEW  GLOBAL  LAW 19-21 (2010) (providing a 
general comparison of common law and shari’a). 
79. BLACK, supra note 70, at 32-37 (providing a general history of the rise of a R 
law-forming class). 
80. See id. at 10-11 (providing a discussion of Muhammad’s prophesies in the 
Qur’an and his sayings as a basis for societal order). 
81. After Muhammad’s death, scholars took on the role of interpreting the 
Qur’an and shari’a. FELDMAN, supra note 71, at 23-25. Twentieth century experiments R 
in Iran, in which the government was run almost entirely under scholarly rule, have not 
increased basic political rights associated with the rule of law, transparency, or due pro­
cess, thus showing the importance of balance and checks of power between the scholar 
and the governing powers. Id. at 134-37. 
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son and analogy (qiyas), consensus (ijma’) and interpretation (ij­
tihad) these original authoritative sources of Islam.82  The result 
was a diverse, non-monolithic, and long-lasting system of jurispru­
dence and social growth with built-in emphases on expert knowl­
edge and consensus, not unlike the development of contemporary 
international law.83 
One of the central, enduring doctrines of Islamic jurisprudence 
was the leader’s status as custodian or servant of communal law, 
rather than its progenitor.84  Rulers were to be judged by qualified 
Islamic scholars and Muslims generally on their record of executing 
and enforcing Islamic law.85  This clear theoretical limit to the 
leader’s legislative powers and discretion was subject to the realities 
of a depoliticized, diffuse, pre-modern imperial citizenry, which 
could both allow centralized political excess or heighten the impor­
tance of the scholars’ work.86  Yet Islamic law’s dependency on 
scholars meant that the ruling political elite “was largely, if not to­
tally, absent from the legal scene.”87  Thus, Islamic scholars exer­
cised a major, often practical, role in granting or withholding 
legitimacy to the leader. 
The range and power of the Arab Islamic and subsequent Ot­
toman Islamic empires decreased over time, while Western eco­
nomic and military power posed a doctrinal and practical challenge 
to Muslim political order in the Middle East and North Africa.  In 
the broad context of Western imperial expansion, Islamic political 
order began to take a back seat to the beginnings of local national­
ism and efforts at centralization.  Whatever the particular cause,88 
the ideal and reality of Islamic government, including the central 
place of the rule of law as a check on arbitrary authority, dimin­
ished until its death blow after World War I.89  At that point, the 
Islamic Ottoman Empire disappeared and the Arab regions were 
82. E.g., Chibli Mallat, From Islamic to Middle Eastern Law: A Restatement of the 
Field (Part II), 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 209, 285 (2004). 
83. FELDMAN, supra note 71, at 4-7. R 
84. BLACK, supra note 70, at 109-11. R 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. WAEL HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW 204 (2005). 
88. There are divergent accounts that nonetheless concur on the importance of 
legal scholars in developing shari’a and the roots of the collapse of Islamic legal institu­
tions in modern political developments. FELDMAN, supra note 71, at 59-75; HALLAQ, R 
supra note 87, at 205. R 
89. Youssef M. Choueiri, Review Article: The Middle East: Colonialism, Islam and 
the Nation State, 37 J. OF CONTEMP. HIST. 649, 651 (2002). 
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divided up into mostly colonial enclaves.90  More to the point, the 
system of scholars that upheld the rule of law disappeared, and, 
with it, the rule of law itself other than a term for colonial govern­
ment enforcement and bureaucratic centralization.91 
The failure of Muslim Arab states to resist modern Western 
domination doomed Islam as the ideological basis for organizing 
government in most of the Middle East for the colonial and early 
post-colonial periods.92  Yet, a second important point here is that 
Islamic political theory remained a significant source of basic ideals, 
particularly with respect to the rule of law.93  One relevant norma­
tive influence is justice as a value that is centrally and popularly 
embedded in Islam.94  Justice as a concept and a discourse is ubiqui­
tous in the Qur’an.95  Moreover, as is true with American legal ide­
als, Islam’s emphasis on justice in the sunna includes significant 
attention to social equity and individual rights.96  Thus, discussions 
of many of the issues that frame legal discourse are engrained in the 
religious identity of a large majority of the people in Arab societies. 
The importance of justice within Islam also contributed to the fact 
that Islamic jurisprudence never fully developed a concept of natu­
ral law.  This has led some to argue that there is no clear theory to 
ground a completely secular legal order, as natural law helped to do 
over time in the West.97 
Islamic political theory can be read as presupposing two more 
specific tenets that have clear relevance to contemporary Western 
ideas about the rule of law: (a) that despite the ideal that political 
authority exists for the benefit of Islam, authority in practice will 
tend toward absolutism, rather than subordinating itself to commu­
nal legitimacy or justice; and (b) that resources autonomous from 
the state are needed to check leaders’ actions.98  This classical Is­
lamic distrust of government and an emphasis on law as a constraint 
90. Id. 
91. FELDMAN, supra note 71, at 81-82. R 
92. Id. at 105-46. 
93. Id. at 4-7. 
94. For general discussion of justice and the Quran, see ABOU EL  FADL, supra 
note 75, at 18-23. R 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 23-30. 
97. GEORGE N. SFEIR, MODERNIZATION OF THE LAW IN  ARAB  STATES 11-12 
(1998). 
98. For a discussion of this fragmented “problem of power,” see MAYER ET AL., 
supra note 58, at 45. R 
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on authority helped ground the influence of Islamic scholars and 
would sound quite familiar to many Americans.99 
Such familiarity is not coincidental.  As legal anthropologist 
Lawrence Rosen and others have noted, Islamic law is essentially a 
common law system, especially in its reliance on local courts and 
local cultural information as characteristics that distinguish both 
from the legal centralization of a civil law system.100  Thus, Ameri­
can and Arab lawyers may share a similar understanding of the im­
portance of locally based legal processes, among other concepts. 
Islamic legal development, unlike Anglo-American common law, 
derived doctrine more from scholarly opinion and consensus, which 
tended to be brief and not necessarily prone to creating binding 
precedent, than through judicial opinions.101 
By the twentieth century, Islamic legal rule had been largely 
banished and tarnished in Arab countries, reduced to the sphere of 
family law by Western colonial rulers and rejected by many natives 
who saw Islamic government as outmoded or ineffective in the face 
of European power.102  At the same time, late-Ottoman centraliza­
tion and subsequent foreign great power control of law in the Mid­
dle East and North Africa fostered three major consequences. 
First, this produced a patchwork of legal orders in a given society, 
rather than the relatively long-standing growth of a unitary national 
legal system such as that which occurred in the United States.103 
Second, it set up an authoritarian norm that law would in fact be 
subordinated to imperial political power.104  And, third, it spurred 
on a tendency for constitutions to exist without a significant history 
of judicial interpretation.105  In some states, such as Morocco, this 
led to frequent postcolonial redrafts of the constitution to reflect 
changes in the power or preoccupations of political authority, in 
99. Ellis Goldberg, Private Goods, Public Wrongs and Civil Society in Some Me­
dieval Arab Theory and Practice, in RULES AND RIGHTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: DEMOC­
RACY, LAW, AND  SOCIETY 251, 255-63 (Ellis Goldberg, Resat Kasaba, and Joel S. 
Migdal eds., 1993). 
100. LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE JUSTICE OF ISLAM 48-49 (2000). 
101. CHIBLI  MALLAT, INTRODUCTION TO MIDDLE EASTERN LAW 61 (2007). 
102. Id. at 132-33.  Feldman also discusses the inner decay of the end of the schol­
ars’ role within the ruling class at the end of the Ottoman Empire. FELDMAN, supra 
note 71, at 88-91. R 
103. For a comparison of constitutions in the West, including the United States, 
and the Middle East see NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD, supra note 28, at 105-10. R 
104. THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 27, at 12. R 
105. NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD, supra note 28, at 106. R 
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contrast with the United States norm of a single, basic constitu­
tional document that can only be modified with difficulty.106 
The legal system of every contemporary Arab nation is a 
unique mixture of Islamic, Ottoman, European, and post-indepen­
dence laws.107  This mélange of legal sources in most Arab societies 
did not in itself preclude legal clarity or checks on authority.  How­
ever, along with the lapses in territorial and ethnic logic that Euro­
pean colonial powers frequently employed in setting borders for 
many of the contemporary nations of the Middle East, the lack of 
legal systemic unity in Arab states has two consequences for recent 
United States-fostered efforts to enhance the rule of law.108  It 
means that the jurisprudential reference points of lawyers in the 
United States are not likely to be of direct use to Arab societies. 
More importantly, the patchwork of legal systems in Arab societies 
has contributed to political situations in which postcolonial Arab 
leaders have had many incentives to centralize their authority and 
no real legal impediments to doing so.109 
This latter point is even more obviously related to the primary 
legacy of colonialism in the Middle East—an emphasis on control 
backed by force that was meant to serve the best interests of the 
colonizer, rather than of indigenous citizens. The political example 
that socialized Arab nationalist elites was colonial regimes’ resort 
to invented political forms like mandates and protectorates to oc­
clude their exercise of raw power.110  Legal norms and institutions 
under colonialism made readily apparent the contradictions be­
tween stated and true purposes.111 
At the same time, these norms and institutions were somewhat 
successful at centralizing political and economic administration. 
However much Arab nationalists rebelled against colonial rule, 
they also learned that the lofty promises of colonial political ideas 
were generally subservient, or even in direct contrast, to the reality 
106. PHILLIP C. NAYLOR, NORTH AFRICA: A HISTORY FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE 
PRESENT 228-29 (2009). 
107. For a succinct summary of the combination of sources of law in each Arab 
area, see THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 27, at 3-5. To be sure, a number of territories R 
escaped direct foreign domination, most notably in the Persian Gulf. See MALLAT, 
supra note 101, at 243. Yet, even in these places, Western legal ideas and practices have R 
supplemented indigenous combinations of Islamic and customary law. THE  RULE OF 
LAW, supra note 27, at 518. R 
108. OWEN, supra note 6, at 11. R 
109. THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 27, at 11-18. R 
110. E.g., EUGENE ROGAN, THE ARABS 219 (2009). 
111. OWEN, supra note 6, at 14. R 
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of police control.112  It is small wonder, facing severe economic and 
other challenges, that these nationalists built on, instead of disman­
tled, the legacies of authoritarian rule that they inherited. 
To be sure, the ideal of the rule of law will often be at odds 
with the centralizing tendency of governments.  I argue that Arab 
states in the Middle East in general had an especially wide gap be­
tween the ideal and the reality because of the combination of the 
relative lack of autonomous, pre-colonial, unified legal order in 
these states and the particular repressive nature of colonial govern­
ments.  More subtly, I am suggesting that the level of discontinuity 
between the rational, legalistic values preached by European ad­
ministrators and their practice of resource extraction and police 
rule tainted the global, secular ideal of the rule of law in a way that 
is unlikely to resonate with the socialization of many American law­
yers and that can complicate many Arabs’ credence of the sincerity 
of international legal actors and doctrines. 
Thus, it is easy for Arabs to view Western lawyers and interna­
tional legal ideas in the West as primarily an ideology of political 
control, and not as a possible check on political abuse or guarantee 
of individual rights.  This is important because it implies that efforts 
by reformers to strengthen the rule of law, and particularly central 
legal institutions, need not be associated with political opening 
within Arab societies.113 
Despite their general legacy of political authoritarianism, Arab 
regimes have not lacked at least partially clear legal structures. For 
example, most Arab states have basic laws or constitutions but little 
recent history of independent judicial review.114  The evidence is 
that Arab leaders take their constitutions seriously, but mostly as 
112. Eg., ROGAN, supra note 110, at 206. R 
113. A striking example of how well-formulated ideas of the rule of law can exist 
alongside repressive political tendencies was the publication by an Iraqi law professor 
of a thoughtful tract on the rule of law as an ideal in Iraq at the very same time that 
Saddam Hussein was beginning to consolidate his particular style of brutal (and often 
legally arbitrary) authoritarian rule. SAMIR  KHAIRI  TAWFIQ, MABDA  SIYADAT  AL­
QA’NUN [THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RULE OF LAW] (1978).  “Considering that it was pub­
lished a year before Saddam Hussein moved from partial to undisputed political control 
of Iraq, this thoughtful, philosophical discussion of the rule of law in terms that would 
sound familiar to Western legal scholars is a particularly interesting treatise on the sub­
ject in the Arabic language.”  David M. Mednicoff, Legalism Sans Frontieres? U.S. 
Rule-of-Law Aid in the Arab World 17 n.17 (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Pa­
per No. 61, 2005), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp61.mednicoff. 
final.pdf. 
114. See NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD, supra note 28, at 35-94, 143-60. R 
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legitimizing documents, rather than sets of provisions enforceable 
by independent reviewers.115 
In short, Arab citizens have two broad historical touchstones 
with respect to the rule of law.  One is the twentieth century experi­
ence of codified law from many, including Western sources, most 
often being used to support centralized, non-democratic rule.116  A 
second is the vague collective knowledge and memory of an earlier 
era, when jurists and judges managed to develop law that could 
check and delegitimize authority, but within the clear norms and 
bounds of Islamic faith.117 
The above means that the theory and practice of legalism in 
contemporary Arab politics has a fragmented quality.  On the one 
hand, Islamist political ideology grew throughout the Middle East 
in the 1980s and 1990s to become the dominant current trope of 
political discourse and opposition.118  As a result, Islam and shari’a 
remain at the rhetorical and actual center of discussions of law in 
contemporary Arab states.  In particular, many Arab constitutions 
clearly endorse Islamic law as the primary source for legislation.119 
The most frequent rallying cry or demand of opponents to current 
Arab governments is the amplification or restoration of shari’a 
law.120 
The extent to which Islam and shari’a should inform the rule of 
law, and what forms this should take, is currently an area of great 
debate and discussion among Arab and non-Arab Muslim schol­
ars.121  Adding to the complexity of this issue is the theoretical con­
tradiction between the Islamic ideal of siyyasa al-shari’a (the 
government of God’s law) and dawlat or siyadat al-qanun (the sov­
ereignty of man-made law).122  The latter term, rather than a native 
Arab Islamic concept, is a direct Arabic translation of the Western 
115. See id. at 143-94 (discussing the political roles for Arab constitutions). 
116. MALLAT, supra note 101, at 167-71, 410-16. R 
117. See, e.g., HALLAQ, supra note 87, at 543-50. R 
118. M.A. Mohamed Salih & Abdullahi Osman El-Tom, Introduction, in INTER­
PRETING ISLAMIC POLITICAL PARTIES 1, 8-12 (M.A. Mohamed Salih ed., 2009). 
119. Even a country with as developed secular legal and social traditions as Egypt 
makes Islam its basic source for legislation in article 2 of its constitution. See CONSTI­
TUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Sept. 11, 1971 (amended 2007). 
120. E.g., FELDMAN, supra note 71, at 105. R 
121. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTI­
ATING THE FUTURE OF SHARI’A 267-89 (2008). 
122. 2 F. ROSENTHAL, THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 177-78 (E. J. Brill, 2006). 
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idea of the rule of law, which may therefore convey a patina of 
inauthenticity to at least some Arab Muslims.123 
Like other broad ideological frames, Islam allows for diverse 
interpretation about law and politics, and is compatible with the 
actual contemporary Arab practice of mixed legal norms and insti­
tutions.  For this reason, a broad majority of government and oppo­
sition fealty to shari’a exists alongside more secular courts, 
bureaucrats and lawyers’ associations in many countries, with the 
forces combined for analytical purposes as the “the legal complex” 
in a recent study of law and democratization.124 
Yet the standing of members of the Arab legal complex is the 
second side of the contemporary rule of law’s fragmented nature. 
Lawyers are sometimes part of an active and growing transnational 
movement of Arabs, linked to global rights Non-Governmental Or­
ganizations (NGO’s) and rule-of-law advocates, and are open to 
more direct import of Western ideas or experiences with legalist 
reform.125  Reflected in international fora and documents such the 
Arab Human Development Reports, this posture does not reject the 
importance of Islamic identity or law per se.126  Rather, it is a pref­
erence, or at least a willingness, to articulate theories of legal and 
political reform in terms translated directly from global usage such 
as dimaqatriyya (democracy), huquq-el-insan (human rights), and 
siyadat al-qanun (rule of law).127  This tendency can be grounded in 
skepticism about the possibility of traditional Islamic terms to adapt 
to modern political debates, a desire to avoid overburdening relig­
ious concepts with excess contemporary meaning, or both.128 
123. Mednicoff, supra note 113, at 17 & n.20 (“One of the signs of both legal R 
pluralism and the relative novelty of the Western notion of the rule of law in Arab 
countries is that there is no single phrase that is used in every country to translate the 
term.  For example, in Morocco, the concept is often referred to as dawla el-haq w’al­
qa’nun (the rule of right and law), instead of siyadat al-qa’nun.  This term gained cur­
rency through the Moroccan monarchy’s efforts to employ it as a slogan for its own 
purported fealty to the ideal of the rule of law.”). 
124. See MALCOLM FEELEY, FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE 
STUDIES OF THE  LEGAL  COMPLEX AND  POLITICAL  LIBERALISM 198-200, 481-84 (Ter­
ence C. Halliday et al. eds., 2007). 
125. See KEVIN  DWYER, ARAB  VOICES: THE  HUMAN  RIGHTS  DEBATE IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST 7-14 (1991). 
126. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 63. R 
127. Fuad S. Naeem. A Traditional Islamic Response to the Rise of Modernity, in 
ISLAM, FUNDAMENTALISM, AND THE BETRAYAL OF TRADITION 89 (Joseph E.B. Lum­
bard ed., 2009). 
128. Id. 
145 
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However, this indigenous Arab reformist tendency within por­
tions of the legal complex is less likely to find broad sociopolitical 
support, unlike Islamist political expression.  In diverse Arab coun­
tries such as Egypt, Morocco, Qatar, and Tunisia, lawyers, law stu­
dents, and lay citizens speak articulately about the rule of law and 
respect its limited success and broader promise to improve rights, 
fairness and political transparency.129  At the same time, there is 
tremendous cynicism about American foreign politics and aid gen­
erally, and lack of confidence in domestic legal and political institu­
tions.130  A century of popular historical associations of Western 
legal and political ideals with colonial and post-colonial highly cen­
tralized governments suggest a broad sense of mistrust with respect 
to the concrete prospects of rule-of-law reform. 
This matters for the regulation and securitization of migrant 
workers in the particular Arab contexts of the oil-rich Gulf states 
because it complicates and sometimes polemicizes the interplay of 
local reform prospects and international human rights pressures. 
First, and most obviously, the ease in which campaigns by Western 
human rights and legal reform advocates can be portrayed as Trojan 
horses for neo-imperialism reduces their influence, while increasing 
at the same time the difficulties Gulf governments might face in 
terms of nationalist legitimacy if they appear to bow to external 
pressures.131 
Second, and more subtly, the possible local perceptions of 
Western rights advocates as inauthentic, hypocritical, or something 
worse means that the politics around legal reform for guest workers 
can often have an unvoiced subtext of sensitivity to Western power 
influence.132  This is not easy for outside lawyers to appreciate fully, 
but it makes international dialogue around rights and law often 
129. This is on the basis of preliminary qualitative surveys that I have adminis­
tered to lawyers and law students in Morocco and Qatar, as well as several longer inter­
views.  However, I am still collecting this data and am careful at this stage to limit 
general and specific conclusions until data collection is further along. 
130. See, e.g., Reports: Arabs Open to Democratic Reforms Despite Setbacks, 
INT’L  FOUND. FOR  ELECTORAL  SYS. (May 15, 2007), http://www.ifes.org/Content/ 
Publications/Feature-Stories/2007/May/Reports-Arabs-Open-to-Democratic-Reforms­
despite-setbacks.aspx (providing summary information and data files available at the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems’ project on the rule of law in Arab 
countries). 
131. See Farid Esack, The Contemporary Democracy and the Human Rights Pro­
ject for Muslim Societies, in CONTEMPORARY ISLAM: DYNAMIC, NOT STATIC 117, 117-27 
(Abdul Aziz Said et al. eds., 2006). 
132. For a relatively public example of this in the press of Dubai, see Rashid 
Saleh Al Oraimy, There’s Something Fishy about the Labour Protests, GULF  NEWS 
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about different things for Western and Gulf actors. Moreover, it 
adds a strong additional impetus for workers’ status to be seen as a 
security issue.  If questions regarding law generally in Arab socie­
ties are steeped in rhetoric around fears of Western control and as­
pirations around shari’a’s relevance, this is even more salient when 
the issue to which law is applied is the nature of non-citizen rights 
in relatively young, dynamic states with overwhelming migrant 
demographic majorities. 
All of the above was in evidence at the Qatar Law Forum. Lo­
cal Gulf legal scholars and officials dominated several sessions fo­
cused on the relevance of Islam and Islamic law, along with its 
ability to encompass and embrace local needs and international 
rights.133  Westerners at other sessions spoke of overcoming deficits 
in Arab law, especially in matters such as women’s rights and politi­
cal freedoms.  This may have left a whiff of neo-imerialism with 
some Arab attendees, based on comments in Arabic which I over­
heard after these sessions. 
Disagreements about the appropriate role of religion in law 
and the status and rights of migrants, remained mostly unvoiced 
and generally unacknowledged.  Yet these disagreements turn on 
important embedded philosophical predispositions in Islamic and 
Western individualist thought in terms of the nature of equality that 
can suggest distinct postures on national identity and security. This 
embedded tension around equality helps inform differing outcomes 
with the regulation of migrant workers in cases like Qatar and the 
United States. 
III.	 EQUALITY, NATIONALISM, AND SECURITY IN AN EXEMPLAR 
ARAB GULF SOCIETY 
In comparative terms, Islam as world religion is often charac­
terized by its broad concern for equality and social justice more 
generally.  One obvious piece of evidence for this concern is the 
requirement of institutionalized charity, zakat, as one of the basic 
(Apr. 26, 2006), http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/there-s-something-fishy­
about-the-labour-protests-1.234295. 
133. For instance, an entire session at the Qatar Law Forum was dedicated to 
“Shari’ah and Legal Reform in the Arab World.” It was chaired by the Attorney-Gen­
eral of Qatar HE Dr. Al bin Fetais Al-Marri and included an international panel of 
Islamic scholars. See Program, supra note 24. R 
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five elements of faith known as the five pillars of Islam.134  Islam’s 
historic aversion to interest-accruing banking is one of varied other 
ways in which a concern for economic equity is perhaps more firmly 
ensconced in traditional ideology than is true for core Western ide­
ological articulations of equality.135 
At the same time, as a faith-based community that arose in a 
seventh century Arabian environment of existing multiple estab­
lished religions, Islam had to find methods to coexist with other 
creeds while maintaining its internal identity and dynamism.136 
There could be no doctrine in the emerging religion that all people 
were equal regardless of religion, and such a doctrine was out of 
place in the seventh century in any case.137  Yet, Islam had two im­
portant institutional innovations for regulating the status of non-
Muslims that helped explain the social system’s success in sus­
taining an array of civilizational and creative diversity in the Medi­
terranean region during Europe’s Dark Ages.138  First is the idea of 
the dhimmi, or permanent guest, a category initially, but not exclu­
sively found in later Islamic history, applied to Christians and Jews 
because of the importance each of their religions held as a prede­
cessor religion to Islam.139  In exchange for payment of a tax, mem­
bers of dhimmi religious groups lived indefinitely under Muslim 
rule, and enjoyed autonomy of worship and a wide array of 
rights.140  At the same time, it was clear that the dhimmi was a 
member of a minority group with explicitly less connection to the 
majority society for not being Muslim.141 
134. See, e.g., 11 A. ZYSOW. ZAKAt, The Encyclopaedia of Islam 406-22 (E. J. 
Brill ed., 2006); KHALED  ABOU  FADL, THE  GREAT  THEFT: WRESTLING  ISLAM FROM 
THE EXTREMISTS 120 (2005). 
135. ABDULLAH SAEED, ISLAMIC BANKING AND INTEREST 1 (2d ed. 1999). 
136. See BLACK, supra note 70, at 10-11 (providing a description of the early days R 
of Islam and the demographic landscape, especially in relation to non-Muslims and trib­
alism within the region). 
137. BAT YE’OR, THE DECLINE OF EASTERN CHRISTIANITY UNDER ISLAM: FROM 
JIHAD TO  DHIMMITUDE 144-47 (Miriam Kochan & David Littman trans., Fairleigh 
Dickinson Univ. Press 1996). 
138. Patrice C. Brodeur. Christianity and Islam, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM AND 
THE MUSLIM WORLD 142, 142-48 (Richard C. Martin ed., 2003). 
139. See BLACK, supra note 70, at 208-09 (discussing the usefulness of the dhimmi R 
rules in the Ottoman empire). 
140. For a brief discussion of this principle that tries to frame issues of Islamic 
communal history in language more familiar to a contemporary legal audience, see 
ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION 88-89 (1990). 
141. Cl. Cahen, Dhimma, in 2 THE  ENCYCLOPEDIA OF  ISLAM 227, 227-31 (B. 
Lewis, Ch. Pellat, & J. Schacht eds., 1991). 
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A second more limited mechanism for allowing official status 
to non-Muslims within explicitly Islamic societies was that of the 
aman.  This term refers to a contract under which any non-Muslim, 
even one not respected for his religious roots with Islam like Chris­
tians and Jews as ahl el-kitab, can have security in his person and 
goods within an Islamic society for a limited period, often less than 
a year.142  If the aman mechanism could apply to anyone outside of 
the community of believers, it did not encompass the general rights, 
acceptance or protection of dhimmi status, nor any likelihood of 
more permanent residence.  However, individual Muslims, as well 
as leaders, had the capacity to grant aman.143 
These two historic Islamic institutions are relevant for two re­
lated reasons.  First, they generally responded to a perceived need, 
and set a precedent, for regulating communal rights in a way that 
explicitly privileged Muslims while allowing for offsetting benefits 
for non-Muslims.  In short, dhimmi status in particular, by eschew­
ing the idea that subcommunities necessarily had to find most of 
their identity in the general society, could take some of the sting out 
of a clear mandate of non-Muslims as separate and unequal.144  Sec­
ond, the two traditional forms of status provided traditional tem­
plates that held more than a little relevance for transposition to the 
regulation of migrant workers in the contemporary era.  Indeed, 
there is a rough analogy that could be made between dhimmis and 
skilled, Westernized professional workers, on the one hand, and 
aman and non-skilled workers from less-developed societies, on the 
other hand, in contemporary oil-rich Arab states like Qatar. 
A clarification is in order here. This Article is not suggesting 
that contemporary Gulf governments make direct use of classical 
Islamic categories for thinking about non-native rights in general or 
worker regulation in particular.  Nor is it my argument that Islamic 
political history and terminology permeate in a deterministic or 
monolithic manner the thought process or legal climate of contem­
porary Arab officials.  Rather, the traditional Islamic acceptance of 
categories of community residence that are less than full communal 
membership is a rough model and touchstone of legitimacy for a 
modern society in which distinct treatments for different classes of 
142. J. Schacht, Amān, in 1 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM NEW EDITION 429, 
429-30 (H.A.R. Gibb, et al. eds., 1986). Ahl el-kitab translates to “people of the book.” 
G. Vajda, Ahl el-kitab, in 1 THE  ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF  ISLAM  NEW  EDITION 264, 264 
(H.A.R. Gibb, et al. eds., 1986). 
143. AN-NA’IM, supra note 140, at 88; HALLAQ, supra note 117, at 332-33. R 
144. Schacht, supra note 142, at 429-30. 
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residents can be accepted, albeit mitigated with broader norms re­
quiring equity, justice, and mercy. 
Moreover, the contemporary context for regulating citizens 
and non-citizens in Qatar is different in many ways from classical 
Islamic history.145  Islam is a more contested, less realized basis for 
social order after its marginalization as the sole actual basis for law 
and politics in post-Ottoman, post-imperial independent Qatari na­
tionhood.146  In addition, the diverse globalized influences from 
Asia, Europe, and North America that permeate the small Arab 
nation as a result of its extraordinary wealth and rapid pattern of 
growth dismiss the idea that any particular model will have exclu­
sive influence on the country’s pattern of regulation, or even unim­
peded autonomy to regulate non-natives. 
Nonetheless, the point here is that historical Islamic norms 
around equality, which do not conform to Western standards of 
simple legislated civil and political rights for all residents, happen to 
resemble the basic norms by which contemporary wealthy, expan­
sive Arab societies like Qatar distinguish between nationals and 
non-nationals.  This is part of a broader pattern of congruence with 
Islamic historical norms of governance that have tended towards 
dynastic family systems, which are ratified and maintained through 
mechanisms of consensus and consultation of leading elite stake­
holders.147  These mechanisms, with titles like shura (consultation) 
and ritualized meeting points (majlis), do not correspond to formal 
procedures for electoral democracy, but they share with the latter 
an emphasis on political representation.148 
Thus, Qatar makes use of political and regulatory reference 
points loosely derived from Islamic models that are more communi­
tarian and egalitarian, but less pluralist and rights-oriented, than 
Anglo-American foundational political norms.  While I do not wish 
to essentialize or over-characterize such a contrast, I do suggest dis­
tinct points of departure for the United States and Qatar with re­
145. There are several major differences that separate Qatar’s contemporary con­
text towards migration from other Arab nations, including their great relative wealth, 
general rejection of the concept of foreigners naturalizing, and that they were “never 
officially a colony of any European power” (although they were a “protected state” 
under the British rule).  Nagy, supra note 32, at 121. R 
146. For a description of the legal system in Qatar see THE RULE OF LAW, supra 
note 27, at 179-85. R 
147. For a more recent historical example of the prevalence of dynastic rule in the 
Middle East, see ROGAN, supra note 110, at 479-81. R 
148. A. Ayalon, Shura, in 9 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM NEW EDITION 504, 
504-06 (C.E. Bosworth, et al. eds., 1997). 
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spect to how to deal with non-citizen residents. Within an 
American political framework, expectations of formal equivalence 
of rights and a national identity founded in historical ideological 
affiliation mean that full citizenship privileges are assumed to be a 
possibility and an end goal for residents.149  This assumption colors 
both immigration policy debates and the imagination of migrants 
themselves. 
By contrast, in Qatar, there is no long-standing political tradi­
tion to presuppose that undifferentiated legislated citizenship for all 
is the likely or assumed outcome for those outside of the dominant, 
national community.  If norms around social and economic fairness 
exist, then distinct sub-communal arrangements—recalling dhimmi 
status, or even more limited and temporary accommodations, recal­
ling aman—are reasonable ways to bring non-nationals into the so­
ciety, without the possibility of full membership or integration. 
With this in mind, there is a logic to the function of the Qatari 
expatriate labor market, where employment offers tend to outbid 
the going rate for a worker based on the wages for similar positions 
in her own native country.150  Thus, engineers engaged in similar 
work in Doha who come from India and the United States make 
vastly different salaries, because of an assumption that differentia­
tion by communal norms is appropriate, so long as that differentia­
tion is accepted generally by the parties themselves.151  Clear 
inequality across diverse populations residing within the same coun­
try is acceptable where there is no expectation that those popula­
tions should integrate or achieve uniform standards of national 
membership. 
Of course, the realities of contemporary Qatar make this lack 
of a historical predisposition towards pluralist integration through 
citizenship more compelling and conscious.  Qatar’s combined 
small native population and tremendous wealth have made 
breakneck expansion through relatively well-paid global labor quite 
likely.  At the same time, the social welfare benefits that this wealth 
allows the Qatari government to provide its citizens would make 
full citizenship economically quite desirable for migrants, which 
149. This is evident in the U.S. Council on Foreign Affair’s emphasis on the im­
portance of immigration to American history and of upholding American values of fair­
ness under the law. COUNCIL ON  FOREIGN  RELATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION  POLICY: 
INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT NO. 63 106-08 (2009), available at http://www.cfr. 
org/publication/20030/us_immigration_policy.html. 
150. Nagy, supra note 32, at 123. R 
151. Id. 
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certainly helps explain why the government, like its peers in the 
Gulf region, allows for no such citizenship prospects for expatriate 
workers.152  Because of this, an additional resonance from Islamic 
theory that might seem logical is also not applied, namely, the pos­
sibility that all Muslims would be fully-integrated members of the 
Qatari nation, irrespective of their geographical origins. While 
non-Qatari Muslims worship alongside Qataris in mosques and find 
dominant social practices largely consonant with their own religious 
backgrounds, they are still generally unable to attain full member­
ship in the country in which they live.153 
Along with the importance of Islamic legal traditions and the 
legitimacy of a notion of inter-communal equity that does not as­
sume equal civil rights and the possibility of citizenship for all, 
Qatari legal policy towards migrants is shaped by the politics of na­
tional identity and security.  These latter points are inter-linked in 
Qatar in several ways. First, the relative youth of the Qatari nation, 
with formal independence dating only to 1971, means that national 
identity is rather loose and undergoing formation.154  With no real 
long-standing historical registers of nationhood, Qatar resorts to 
genealogy and traditional dress as markers of shared identity.155 
Second, a traditional distinction that allows for securitization of mi­
grants is Islam’s broad divide between societies of Muslims and of 
non-believers, with the latter at times referred to dar-al harb (“the 
152. COUNTRY  REPORT: QATAR, FREEDOM  HOUSE (2010), http://www.freedom 
house.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010&country=7902. 
153. This lack of full communal equality for non-Qatari Muslims is an embedded 
tension within the society.  Qataris often will complain about whether many of the non-
Qatari Muslims of Southeast Asian and other origins are true Muslims, an occurrence 
that suggests an understanding that true Muslims should experience broad social equal­
ity.  Qatari men are allowed to marry non-Qatari Muslim women, although the reverse 
is generally not true. Need to Ensure Equal Citizenship Rights to Women, THE PENIN­
SULA (May 5, 2010), http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/q/56-tofol-jassim-al-nasr/2049­
need-to-ensure-equal-citizenship-rights-to-women.html.  The official rules regarding cit­
izenship specify continued residence for twenty-five years as a necessary, but not suffi­
cient, precondition.  Barbara Bibbo, Expats Can Apply for Qatari Citizenship, GULF 
NEWS (June 6, 2006), http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/expats-can-apply-for-qatari­
citizenship-1.239793.  Despite all of this, Qatar’s ruler can and does grant citizenship, 
most often to prominent Muslims, again reflecting the historical norm towards conceiv­
ing of community based on religious affiliation.  An example of this was the grant of 
Qatari citizenship to a wealthy Muslim Indian painter. See, e.g., India’s Exiled ‘Picasso’ 
Takes Qatari Citizenship, FRANCE 24 (Feb. 27, 2010), http://www.france24.com/en/ 
20100227-indias-exiled-picasso-takes-qatari-citizenship. 
154. ROSEMARIE SAID ZAHLAN, THE CREATION OF QATAR 112 (1979). 
155. See Nagy, supra note 32, at 127-31.  In fact, within the Qatari people, there R 
are many variations of identity reflected by variations of dress, family names, and other 
cues outsiders would view as subtle. See id. 
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house of war”).156  Again, I want to be clear that I am not sug­
gesting a tendency for Qatari Muslims, who are extremely global­
ized in their influences and lifestyles, to think of outsiders as 
enemies; this is categorically not the case. Rather, the existence of 
one particular distinction within Islamic history can act as a very 
minor push to help people already inclined to do so in some situa­
tions to consider the issue of regulating non-natives in security 
terms. 
A more material reason that Qatari policies towards non-na­
tionals are readily securitized is the general geographical and demo­
graphic context of the small country.  Qatar is located between two 
regional powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and close to states with 
recent histories of internal violence, Iraq and Yemen.157  The com­
bination of the very real concern posed by Qatar’s neighborhood 
and its history of being under the protection of a great power for 
the past century has meant that the country is nearly entirely de­
pendent militarily on the United States.158  In other words, in 
Qatar, the traditional core concern of national security policy, terri­
torial integrity and protection, is essentially contracted out to an­
other country, which pushes other issues like non-national residents 
into the forefront of security considerations. 
This is especially the case given the country’s small native pop­
ulation and swelling ranks of non-national residents.  Because of 
their society’s immense recent wealth, and the ambitions for pre­
eminence in culture, media, and sports that this has fed, Qataris are 
a minority of around 10% within their own country.159  The diverse 
multinational consumer culture that has emerged in Qatar, and 
elsewhere in small Arab oil states, has turned the world’s closest 
current lingua franca, English, into the dominant influence in a 
highly Arabized land.160  Thus, despite their wealth and privilege, it 
156. A. Abel, Dar al-harb, in 2 THE  ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF  ISLAM  NEW  EDITION 
126, 126 (B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat & J. Schacht eds., 1991). 
157. An article in the Qatari newspaper The Peninsula indicates that Qatari peo­
ple recognize their location in the world as an opportunity to be a moderator between 
the West and their less peaceful neighbors. See Qatar Can Serve as a Bridge Between 
East and West, THE  PENINSULA (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/ 
qatar-perspective/1072-qatar-can-serve-as-a-bridge-between-east-and-west.html. 
158. Sunday Morning: Qatar in Transition, supra note 55. R 
159. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 43 (“Foreign workers comprise as much as R 
85% of the total population and make up about 90% of the total labor force.”). 
160. See CENT. INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY, THE  WORLD  FACTBOOK: FIELD  LIST­
ING–LANGUAGES, http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/ 
print_2098.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2011) (listing, for example, Qatar as having English 
as a common second language and Kuwait as having English widely spoken). 
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is easy for Qataris to feel ethnically, linguistically, and especially, 
culturally overwhelmed in their own society. This, in turn, makes it 
natural for policy towards migrants to become securitized.  Indeed, 
the status of migrants easily becomes the top local issue of national 
security when military and territorial integrity are largely outside of 
the realm of government action. 
The two main migrant populations present different possible 
visions of insecurity to the small native population, reinforcing a 
possible perceived native need to securitize their status.161  The 
comparatively small Western mainly professional group is most 
likely to challenge usually indirectly, established local social prac­
tices, whether this is around questions of language, dress, romance, 
or religious pluralistic equality.162  On the other hand, the large 
populations of often exploited less-skilled construction and domes­
tic workers from South and Southeast Asia raise concerns for na­
tives about strikes, criminal activity, and other issues that could 
disrupt the normal flow of Qatari society.163  Taken together, rea­
sonable or not, fears of Western workers’ pressure on traditional 
social practices and Eastern workers’ shut-down of daily life com­
bine to buttress the likelihood that regulating the large non-na­
tional majority is viewed as a core question of national security. 
If the non-national vast majority of residents in small Arab oil-
rich countries like Qatar are easily seen as a potential security 
threat, they are also indispensible.  Policies aimed at nativizing sig­
nificant segments of the workforce have run afoul of a combination 
of lack of incentives or adequate training for some natives and the 
sheer pace and ambition of social and economic growth.164  Con­
temporary wealthy Gulf city-states like Abu Dhabi, Doha, and 
Dubai compete informally for tangible accomplishments on the 
global stage, such as Abu Dhabi’s world-class museums, Doha’s 
media and university cities and Dubai’s extravagant building 
161. Efforts to break perceived security threats from migration into discrete cate­
gories go back to Myron Weiner’s edited volume, see INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND 
SECURITY 10-18 (Myron Weiner ed., 1993). 
162. For an example, see the blog posts of a British national blogging under the 
pseudonym, Jane01, on the Qatar Living online website. See, e.g., Jane01, QATAR LIV­
ING (Mar. 31, 2008 6:31 AM), http://www.qatarliving.com/blog/jane01. 
163. Andrew Gardner, Labor Camps in the Gulf States, Viewpoints: Migration 
and the Gulf, THE MIDDLE EAST INSTIT. 57, http://ups.academia.edu/AndrewGardner/ 
Papers/328943/Labor_Camps_in_the_Gulf_States.  For general Middle Eastern history 
of labor strikes by migrant workers, see OWEN, supra note 6, at 204-07. R 
164. See, e.g., Tofol Jassim Al-Nasr, Patriotism vs Privilege, THE PENINSULA (May 
2, 2010 8:52 PM), http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/q/56-tofol-jassim-al-nasr/1693­
tofol-jassim-al-nasr.html; see also, Berrebi et al., supra note 42, at 432. R 
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projects.  However, it is hard to imagine this extraordinarily rapid 
growth continuing other than on a foundation of copious workers 
that the native population cannot possibly supply. 
Thus, a government like Qatar’s cannot restrict the influx of 
migrants without choking its grand ambitions for rapid develop­
ment.  Securitizing the inflow of migrants then becomes a question 
of information and internal management, rather than of reducing 
overall numbers.  In short, in its lack of interest or ability to think of 
restricting legal migrants as the primary component of immigration 
policy and in its lack of predisposition to assume that migrants are 
likely to be able to integrate into national society in the long-run, 
Qatar’s government is quite different from its analogues in the 
United States and West more generally, despite at least as much 
overall tendency to securitize the issue area. 
Thus, from the perspective of migrants, the dark side of securi­
tizing immigration policy diverges a great deal in Qatar and the 
United States.  In Qatar, there is little illegal immigration, facili­
tated both by the country’s desert and ocean land borders, and by 
its large numbers of legal migrant workers. Thus, the major chal­
lenges for officials in Doha would seem to be keeping close tabs on, 
and discouraging the potential for social destabilization of, the le­
gions of non-citizens in the country. The process for regularizing 
non-nationals’ residence documents is rather elaborate, and in­
cludes health scans and biometrics.165  New migrant workers clearly 
pick up the message that they are not only the intense subjects of a 
national security apparatus, but they are also, in addition, depen­
dent on the help and agency of their employers, who actually rec­
ommend and maintain their resident visas.166 
165. Official Allays Fear of Mandatory Health Tests, THE  PENINSULA, July 4, 
2010, http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/qatar/55804-official-allays-fears-of-mandatory­
health-tests.html. 
166. Qatar’s recent 2009 reform of its labor law prohibits employers from holding 
the passports of their employees. Labour Law and Changes in Sponsorship Rules, THE 
PENINSULA, Feb. 24, 2011, http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/law/143688-labour-law­
and-changes-in-sponsorship-rules.html.  However, as is true in many Gulf Arab socie­
ties, this practice continues, and employers handle the official status of their non-native 
employees in any case, because of the nature of the kefala, sponsorship system, under 
which all foreigners remain in the country based on their contracts with their employ­
ers, rather than the leave of the state itself.  Nagy, supra note 32, at 122. A recent R 
investigative report from Verité shows that the problems related to the sponsorship 
system are still very real, despite recent reforms. Help Wanted: Hiring, Human Traffick­
ing and Modern-Day Slavery in the Global Economy, VERITÉ RES. AND ADVOC. INITIA­
TIVE 58, June 2010, http://www.verite.org/helpwanted/. 
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In addition, the acceptance of inequality across national and 
racial grounds means that lower-status migrant workers suffer 
longer lines, and possibly more degrading treatment, at the hands of 
the Qatari state than do higher-status Westerners, often in the same 
facility.167  In a context of great wealth and pressures to regulate the 
myriads of foreign residents of diverse backgrounds and often low 
status, individual workers’ concerns for privacy and other civil 
rights take a back seat to the potential security threat that they are 
presumed to represent.  If Qatari state surveillance is not nearly so 
extensive than that in many non-elected political systems, there is 
nonetheless a sufficiently copious amount of biometric and other 
private data on millions of foreigners to arouse concern.168  Indeed, 
in other wealthy Arab contexts, officials have voiced pride in their 
ability to gather, and if necessary, to deploy a tremendous amount 
of personal data on foreign workers resident in their territory.169 
It is increasingly the case that the United States, and other 
countries, are following the practice of small states like Qatar in 
gathering growing amounts of biometric and other sensitive data on 
non-citizen legal residents.170  Nonetheless, the major focus of U.S. 
immigration policy, in national security terms, is in limiting legal 
immigration and attempting, however unsuccessfully, to halt illegal 
non-citizen entry into the country.171  In other words, the major 
thrust of American policy to control non-citizens is that of barring 
entry by law and by force, and imprisoning and expelling aliens 
167. A personal example of this was the comparative treatment of me and my 
wife during the biometric procedures to obtain our residence permits in 2006.  In part 
due to the relatively conservative social norms of the country, women and men are 
separated during these procedures.  My wife, who is half-Indian, was assumed to be a 
worker from India, and was made to wait in a much longer line for fingerprinting, while 
I was ushered into an air-conditioned VIP room because of my presumed Western 
origin. 
168. Chris V. Panganiban, Filipinos in Qatar Join Saudi Protest Against E-Pass­
ports, THE  PENINSULA, July 10, 2010, http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/qatar/119741­
filipinos-in-qatar-join-saudi-protest-against-e-passports.html. 
169. See, e.g., Marten Youssef & Kareem Shaheen, UAE is Urged to Find a Bal­
ance, THE  NAT’L (Oct. 7, 2009), http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/health/uae­
is-urged-to-find-a-balance (quoting Dr. Ahmed al Marzooqi, United Arab Emirates’ 
Director of the DNA Database Department, regarding plans to implement UAE’s na­
tional DNA database). 
170. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SAFETY & SECURITY OF U.S. BORDERS: BIOMET­
RICS, http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/info/info_1336.html (last visited Jan. 23, 
2011) (providing an official government statement on what is collected and why). 
171. See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 149, at 6-7; see also Devel- R 
oping a Strong Border and Immigration Policy, HERITAGE  FOUND. (Aug. 17, 2010), 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/08/Developing-a-Strong-Border-and­
Immigration-Policy. 
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when this fails.  In Qatar and similar societies, by contrast, the pol­
icy is somewhat less coercive and restrictive, in that it is geared to­
wards controlling, and providing a base level of socioeconomic 
benefits for, legal aliens who enter in much higher proportions vis­
à-vis the citizen population.172 
For non-citizen residents of Qatar, this difference in the nature 
of state policy leads to distinct expectations. They know from the 
beginning of their time in the tiny country that their value is time-
bound, and dependent on work, and their stake in the society is 
correspondingly limited.  At the same time, since there is no expec­
tation of citizenship, and this is true across the board for migrants, 
legal status and national identity, for better or worse, are 
transparent. 
This contrasts with the shifts in possible national status and 
identity, and the burdensome calculations they foster, for many 
non-citizens in the United States.  What Saskia Sassen depicts as 
the diffuse categories of nationality and legality that are illuminated 
by contemporary immigration173 is a phenomenon in countries like 
the United States.  Here, for example, the diverse, unpredictable 
determinants of immigration policy and the real possibility of full 
citizenship can make entering and remaining in the country ille­
gally, under some circumstances, a more likely route to eventual 
citizenship than working within the legal visa system.174  On the 
other hand, the growing securitization of immigration policy has in­
creased the risks for, and backlash against, illegal non-citizen re­
sidents, so that the chance of incarceration and deportation is 
great.175  Thus, the promise, with frequently shifting ground, of 
equal citizenship can encourage migrants to undertake a pattern of 
calculated unregulated work, other routine legal transgression, con­
cealment, and risk that are, at best, disruptive, and, at worst, unpre­
dictably uprooting and coercive. 
172. Nagy, supra note 32, at 122. R 
173. See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS 261-63 (2006). 
174. Paral, supra note 16, at 6. R 
175. See MASSEY & SANCHEZ, supra note 3, at 77-78. The following illustrates R 
the increase in immigration enforcement in the United States after the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001: 
Whereas in 1986 only 25,000 immigrants were arrested and deported from the
 
United States, by 1996 the figure had climbed to 160,000 . . . deportations
 
surged to reach a record 359,000 in 2008; this level has never been seen before
 
in U.S. history and outdoes the mass deportation campaigns of the 1930s by a
 
factor of three.
 
Id. at 77-78. 
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From the regulating state’s perspective, implementing the 
securitization of migrant workers by limiting inflows rather than 
maximizing legal contractors is both expensive and imperfect.  De­
spite the millions of dollars that U.S. Homeland Security and other 
law enforcement agencies spend yearly on border control, it is 
widely acknowledged that trying to make American borders en­
tirely closed to illegal aliens is impossible.176  The costs of imprison­
ing and deporting illegal migrants are an additional severe burden, 
and one that might be avoidable if more modest spending was di­
rected instead to subsidizing or regularizing migrant jobs to elimi­
nate some of the incentives for employers to hire illegally off of the 
books.177 
Of course, many conditions differ between countries like Qatar 
and the United States that could preclude shifting U.S. practices to 
reflect the basic thrust of Qatari problems.  Unemployment, rather 
than a surplus of possible jobs, is of much greater concern in the 
United States, and may help account for the strong popular anti-
immigrant pressures that have contributed to the general upswing 
in the securitization of migration policy.  In Qatar, the combination 
of less populist democratic practices of the political system and a 
continuing rapidly expanding economy, that leaves little real alter­
native to massive numbers of foreign workers, means that cutting 
back on legal contract workers is unlikely.178 
Nonetheless, part of the implication of this argument is that 
securitizing migration policy itself is in part the cause of anti-immi­
grant sentiment. For one thing, decades of United States restric­
tions on legal foreign workers have helped establish the high levels 
of illegal immigration.179  This, over time, helped sustain the under­
ground low-wage illegal alien employment market, encouraged neg­
ative popular American images of migrants as law-breakers or 
176. See, e.g., C. STEWART VERDERY, JR., BRICK BY BRICK: A HALF-DECADE OF 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION RE­
FORM 10, 12-14 (2010), available at http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/documents/doc/ 
062810_cap_dhs_enforcement. 
177. See, e.g., Jack Martin & Eric A. Ruark, The Fiscal Burden of Illegal Immigra­
tion on United States Taxpayers 21-22 (2010), available at http://www.fairus.org/site/ 
DocServer/USCostStudy_2010.pdf?docID=4921.  For more general discussion of the se­
vere problems that illegal aliens face if captured, see generally Karen Tumlin et al., A 
Broken System, NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CENTER (July 28, 2009), http://www.nilc.org/imm 
lawpolicy/arrestdet/A-Broken-System-2009-07.pdf. 
178. Berrebi et al., supra note 42, at 430-42. R 
179. See, e.g., Douglas S. Massey, Borderline Madness: America’s Counterproduc­
tive Immigration Policy, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 129, 129-38 (Carol M. Swain, ed., 
2007). 
 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE103.txt unknown Seq: 38 27-SEP-11 10:03 
158 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:121 
threats to national culture,180 and fostered an impulse towards more 
coercive and incarceratory policies.  The promise of citizenship and 
sociopolitical rights that this entails, along with the reality of an in­
creasingly closed and punitive set of national policies and a labor 
market nonetheless dependent on low-wage, low-status labor, 
makes for a destructive quality of life for alien workers in the 
United States that is, in practice, not easy to see as superior to the 
clearly more overtly discriminatory practices of states like Qatar. 
IV. COMPARING SECURITIZED MIGRATION POLICY IN QATAR
 
AND THE UNITED STATES
 
I am not arguing that eliminating the possibility of citizenship 
for non-national workers in the United States is just or desirable. 
The theory behind the United States as an open society for people 
of diverse origins remains in itself a major magnet for migrants, and 
it is one that should enhance the lives of both natives and the small 
group of migrants who see the theory’s realization.  In Qatar, the 
lack of full equality norms along national and ethnic grounds is 
hardly a global model, and leads to many instances of pernicious 
worker mistreatment which deserve to receive the level of human 
rights focus that is increasingly a focus of Western NGO’s and gov­
ernments.181  Moreover, countries like Qatar are no less prone to 
securitize migrant worker policy, and this securitization has en­
couraged a level of biometric and other incursions into personal pri­
vacy that are being implemented throughout the world and raise 
frightening prospects for heightened surveillance and 
incarceration.182 
Rather, this Article has two major points. The first, broader 
one is that the securitization of migration policy encourages a range 
of coercive practices that have the dual effects of increasing state 
coercive budgets and capacity, and of exacerbating tensions be­
tween citizens and non-nationals in societies as diverse as Qatar and 
the United States.  It is not mere coincidence, but a partial function 
180. See, e.g., Samuel Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, FOREIGN  POL’Y, 
MAR./APR. 2004 30, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/03/01/the_ 
hispanic_challenge. 
181. See The Island of Happiness: Exploitation of Migrant Workers on Saadiyat 
Island, Abu Dhabi, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 19, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/ 
2009/05/18/island-happiness-0. 
182. For a discussion of the implementation international biometric identification, 
see David Lyon, National IDs in a Global World: Surveillance, Security, and Citizenship, 
42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 607, 607-08 (2010). 
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of the facts and rhetoric of non-national securitization, that popular 
native suspicion around foreigners takes the same forms of fear of 
criminal activity and concern for national culture in Doha that it 
does in Detroit.  If non-nationals are, in practice, unlikely to be­
come full members of society, it is natural for nationals to react to 
this with a mix of distrustful attitudes. 
This relative similarity in the effects of securitizing migrant 
workers where legal and political norms diverge as much as they do 
in the United States and Qatar suggests the second more subtle ma­
jor point of the Article.  That is, if actual results of securitizing mi­
gration are comparable across countries with quite different ideals 
around citizenship and equality, the usefulness of the norms them­
selves requires a bit of unpacking.  This is especially the case in the 
context of the United States and Arab Gulf societies, where the 
tendency of the former is to assume the legal backwardness and to 
problematize the sociopolitical practices of the latter, as noted in 
the discussion above of the Qatar Law Forum.183  Migrant workers’ 
rights problems are undoubtedly severe in Arab oil-rich societies, 
and deserve the intense human rights scrutiny that they receive. 
Despite this, some of the flow of rhetoric around rights issues from 
the West may be suspect if the reality of foreign workers’ exper­
iences in the West is comparably problematic in practice to what 
happens in the Gulf. 
The reality of migration in the United States is that the level of 
securitization may have led to reductions in recent years in illegal 
foreign workers, but that millions remain either incarcerated, in the 
process of being deported, or living a clandestine existence with lit­
tle current hope of regularization.184  The illusory promise of full 
citizenship and the fears of national identity or economic competi­
tion that feed into, and are replicated by, securitization, help frame 
this severe problem.  Yet many migrants may well view the prospect 
of stable employment in the United States without attaining native 
rights as acceptable, while the labor market still seems to include 
positions that native Americans cannot or will not fill.185  This is, of 
course, the situation in Qatar. 
183. An Introduction, supra note 25. R 
184. See, e.g., William Finnegan, Borderlines, NEW YORKER, July 26, 2010, at 19, 
19-20; Douglas Massey, Backfire at the Border: Why Enforcement without Legalization 
Cannot Stop Illegal Immigration, CATO INST. TRADE POL’Y ANALYSIS, June 13, 2005, at 
1. 
185. For a discussion of conflict between countries’ labor needs and policy see 
Cornelius & Tsuda, supra note 10, at 9-11. R 
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Thus, the high level of fixed-term contract legal workers in 
Qatar suggests several possible lessons for countries like the United 
States.  First, an emphasis on a wider range of legal migrant catego­
ries, or a large expansion of the numbers of legal, fixed-term mi­
grant workers, might be a less expensive and more enforceable 
general shift in migration policy worth considering in the United 
States.  The lack of assumed interconnection between work con­
tracts and possible citizenship in places like Qatar, though unfair in 
some ways, allows for a level of clarity for natives and non-natives 
alike around the issue that at least permits a very large number of 
worker visas relative to the population.  Raising the number of 
fixed-term legal workers as one strand of a disentangled immigra­
tion policy is, in fact, a part of United States discussions of immigra­
tion reform.186 
A second possible lesson of the divergence in legal policy amid 
heavy securitization of the issue of foreign workers in the United 
States and the Arab Gulf is the tendency for securitization to com­
plicate flexible management of the issue generally.  In Arab con­
texts, this can take several forms.  Generally, securitizing the 
question of migrant workers’ regulation fosters additional elements 
of mistrust among natives and the diverse migrant subpopulation 
groups, thereby likely producing, or facilitating, stepped-up inter­
group conflict and state intrusion.187  The above is less a problem in 
contemporary Qatar than in comparable city-states, such as Dubai 
in the United Arab Emirates.  There, the sheer extent and speed of 
growth have been accompanied by heightened securitization, spin­
ning into strategies of central control that retard the very open busi­
ness environment that helps fuel the growth, such as the recent 
decision to ban Blackberry smart phone data plans because their 
autonomy from local state control allowed them to be termed a se­
186. See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 149, at 6-7, 84-88; see also R 
Angela Maria Kelley et al., Principles for Immigration Reform, CENTER AM. PROGRESS 
(June 24, 2009), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/06/immigration_ 
principles.html; Demetrios G. Papademetriou et al., Aligning Temporary Immigration 
Visas with US Labor Market Needs: The Case for a New System of Provisional Visas, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (July 2009), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Provisional_ 
visas.pdf. 
187. One clear statement of Qatari’s mistrust of non-native workers is in the im­
plementation of “Family Day” at the shopping centers in Doha. See Out of Bounds, 
THE  PENINSULA (Oct. 1, 2008, 1:48 AM), http://archive.thepeninsulaqatar.com/ 
component/content/article/349-qatar-newsarchive/75420.html. 
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curity threat.188  In Qatar, by contrast, over a decade of managed 
central growth of relatively open media, like the regional cable sta­
tions of Al-Jazira, and higher educational institutions, has created a 
counter-weight of relative press and intellectual opaqueness to the 
Orwellian and communal divisive tendencies of the securitized 
state.189 
In fact, the pathologies of securitizing legal migration policies 
in the United States may be even more severe than in Qatar.  Even 
accounting for the understandable ongoing effects on American 
culture and politics of the attacks by non-U.S. citizens of September 
11, 2001, recent trends in securitizing migrants have included re­
markable amplification, even duplication, of surveillance organiza­
tions190 and anti-immigrant border amplification.  The 
securitization of the national debate around residents without legal 
status has turned ugly, and possibly unconstitutional, in recent 
months, with Arizona’s 2010 law that authorizes security workers to 
stop and arrest suspected illegal immigrants.191 
Different norms around citizenship and equality in the United 
States, despite seeming fairer than the over-segmentation by na­
tional origin of countries like Qatar, do not necessarily lead to 
kinder outcomes for non-national workers.  Indeed, the inability, or 
security-driven populist democratic disinclination, for the U.S. gov­
ernment to live up to its own official promises around citizenship 
may feed into the broad problems of national migration policy, by 
giving illegal migrants false hope for regularized status or unwitting 
incentives to conceal their presence for fear of coercion by increas­
ingly securitized federal and state governments. 
188. See, e.g., Blackberry Ban in the Middle East (ABC television broadcast Aug. 
2, 2010), available at http://abcnews.go.com/International/video/uae-bans-blackberrys­
blackberry-messenger-hard-track-11308307. 
189. See Delinda C. Hanley, Qatar’s Education City is Building Bridges to a Better 
Future, 26 WASH. REP. ON  MIDDLE E. AFF., Aug. 2007, at 30, 30-32; see also Wendy 
Wallace, Qatar Invests in a Vision, THE MIDDLE EAST, July 2005, at 57, 57-59 (discuss­
ing commitment to education in general). 
190. See, e.g., Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: A Washing­
ton Post Investigation, WASH. POST., July 19, 2010 - Dec. 20, 2010, http://projects.wash­
ingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/ (providing a series of reports on U.S. intelligence 
organizations and their relative secrecy and lack of political accountability). 
191. See, e.g., Archibold, supra note 8, at A1; see also, James Doty, Arizona’s R 
New Immigration Law I Unconstitutional, SALON.COM (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www. 
salon.com/news/feature/2010/04/26/is_arizona_immigration_law_constitutional (discuss­
ing the law’s likely constitutional problems); Ruthann Robson, Arizona Immigration 
Law SB 1070, CONST. LAW  PROF  BLOG (Apr. 24, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad. 
com/conlaw/2010/04/arizona-immigration-law.html. 
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This suggests a third and final lesson from the diverse forms of 
securitized legal regulation of migrant workers in Qatar and the 
United States.  In an era of legal globalization, it is understandable 
that lawyers and policymakers would assume that similar standards 
and practices around migrants are sensible. To a large extent, 
global equity and universalistic fairness dictate this outcome. 
Nonetheless, if underlying social understandings of law and of 
equality differ significantly, as I have argued is true with respect to 
the secularization and security usage of law in the United States 
and Qatar, then these deeper distinctions need to be at least taken 
into account in fashioning legal outcomes.192 
More specifically, reasonable predispositions, such as those in 
the official rhetoric at the Qatar Law Forum, towards the view that 
legal rights must take similar shape and reflect universal norms, 
have to consider the countervailing social undercurrents, including 
religious establishment and anti-immigration populism.  I have ar­
gued that some aspects of Islamic history and decoupling from cen­
tral Arab state control can facilitate an understanding of non-
nationals as separate in their rights from citizens in some ways. 
However, this separation at least allows for large numbers of con­
tractually-limited, fixed-term non-native workers in societies like 
Doha, whereas broad popular pressures against non-citizen workers 
in the United States have led to a very different set of problems for 
these workers.  In short, especially because of the securitization of 
migration issues, the contemporary situation for guest workers can 
be summed up as a pointed paraphrase of Tolstoy’s famous book-
opening phrase.  Namely, each state that securitizes the legal status 
of non-national workers tends to make those workers unhappy in 
their own way.193 
192. See supra Part I. 
193. LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky 
trans., Penguin Classics 2003) (1878). 
